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SUMMARY 
 
The digital transformation taking place in the last decades is a revolution with a deep economic, social, 
and cultural impact. It has created enormous opportunities and also new risks. Growth, enhanced 
productivity, increased citizenship engagement, better democracy and social inclusion are some of the 
opportunities but at the same time these transformations are challenging human and consumer rights, 
social policies and economic efficiency. Reaching the huge potential benefits of the digital revolution 
requires economic analysis to guide new regulations and policies accompanying technological 
advancement.  
This thesis proposes regulations and strategies for an optimal provision of digital networks, goods and 
services contributing to some of the topics of focus in recent literature on digital economy. One problem 
is entry barriers to companies selling internet access. We contribute to the literature by analyzing one of 
the causes of the existence of entry barriers, the problem of how efficiently allocate the radio-spectrum. 
Another problem is the optimal prices to remunerate network providers, digital service providers, 
consumers and vendors. We contribute by examining the impact of price discrimination of internet 
content providers under duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail 
broadband access in chapter 3. 
Chapter 1 offers some proposals for the evaluation of the efficient allocation of spectrum to radio 
communication services. New approaches to spectrum management have resulted in a more efficient 
production of services. However, the role of the public sector is still essential in spectrum allocation. 
This chapter provides a methodology to measure the net benefit of the reallocation of a spectrum band 
intended to guide regulators and policy makers. We have identified the following facts.  
 The calculation of benefits and of the opportunity costs of spectrum usage should include the 
external value associated to the provision of services. 
 
 Demand for spectrum is driven by the quantity and quality of services consumed. In some cases, 
the population density is also a driver of spectrum demand.  
 
 The cost of deploying networks to use the spectrum is a key element to determine the private 
value associated to the use of a frequency band. However, there are other inputs such as the 
number of stations, or the use of wired solutions that may be substitutes of a frequency band.  
 
 The utility of spectrum usage is variable. Different portions of spectrum are not perfect 
substitutes one another, consequently, frequencies have variable substitution margins. 
 
 Reallocation of spectrum produces transition costs that should be included in the cost benefit 
analysis. Sometimes the reallocation may also reduce costs if the provision of the incumbent 
service is streamlined. 
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 Economies of scale in the manufacture of the equipment required to use a frequency band can 
be obtained if the band is planned to be allocated in a harmonized way across a large 
geographical area with high expected number of customers. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the optimal path and speed of spectrum management reform under associated 
uncertain costs and benefits. This chapter offers a model to ascertain the optimal speed of reform and 
shed some light on the policy options to reduce uncertainty in the associated costs and benefits of 
reform. We have determined when to choose a gradual or big bang reform depending on technology 
and whether to wait or not for a new technological advancement. Both results depend on the expected 
outcome of the reform, the probability of realization of the considered scenarios and the value of 
reversal to the previous situation.  
Chapter 3 presents a model of price discrimination of over the top providers under duopolistic 
competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail broadband access. We discuss the 
impact of product differentiation and price discrimination on social welfare, and offer systematic 
simulations using feasible ranges for parameters value to help discern the impact of departing from 
network neutrality regulation on social welfare. 
Abandoning network neutrality regulation reduces the quantity of internet content produced. Network 
diversity produces a significant reduction of prioritized content while the quantity of content non-
susceptible of being prioritized remains unchanged. The reduction in the quantity of content is equal in 
the two network diversity scenarios considered – both and only one access provider prioritizing traffic.   
Under network diversity access providers enjoy higher income coming from the tax charged to content 
providers for prioritization but content providers offering prioritized content, and advertisers suffer an 
income reduction. Abandoning network neutrality has two different types of effects on consumer’s 
utility. On one hand, it reduces utility through a decrease in the amount of content. On the other hand, 
the disutility caused by the delay of data packages is reduced.  The simulation is necessary to measure 
net impact. Simulations show that network neutrality regulation is welfare superior to network diversity 
under the model assumptions with the values and value ranges given to parameters. Departing from 
network neutrality regulation leads to an abrupt decrease of the consumer surplus of internet users. 
This effect weights more in total welfare than the increase in the access providers’ surplus coming from 
the tax charged to content providers.  
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  RESUMEN 
La transformación digital que está teniendo lugar en las últimas décadas es una revolución con un 
profundo impacto económico, social y cultural que ha creado  enormes oportunidades y también nuevos 
retos. Algunas de las oportunidades son un mayor crecimiento económico, mejoras de la productividad, 
mayor participación ciudadana y una mayor inclusión social, pero al mismo tiempo estas 
transformaciones desafían los derechos de los ciudadanos y de los consumidores, las políticas sociales y 
la eficiencia económica. Para alcanzar el enorme potencial de la revolución digital es necesario que el 
análisis económico guie la regulación y las políticas que acompañan al desarrollo tecnológico. 
Esta tesis propone nuevas normas y estrategias para una óptima provisión de redes, bienes y servicios 
digitales, contribuyendo en algunos de los temas de interés de la literatura reciente sobre economía 
digital. Un problema es la existencia de barreras a la entrada en el mercado de provisión de servicios de 
acceso a internet. Contribuimos a la literatura existente sobre este asunto, analizando en los capítulos 1 
y 2, una de las causas de la existencia dichas barreras, la atribución ineficiente del espectro 
radioeléctrico. Otro problema es la formación de precios socialmente óptima para remunerar a los 
proveedores de acceso a internet, los proveedores de servicios digitales, los usuarios y los vendedores 
de publicidad. Contribuimos a esta materia examinando en el capítulo 3 el impacto de la discriminación 
de precios sobre proveedores de contenidos cuando en el mercado minorista de acceso a internet existe 
competencia imperfecta, duopolio, y diferenciación multidimensional de producto. 
El capítulo 1 ofrece propuestas para la evaluación de la eficiencia de una atribución de espectro a un 
servicio de radiocomunicaciones. Las nuevas técnicas de gestión del espectro han dado lugar a una 
provisión más eficiente de los servicios. Sin embargo, el papel del sector público sigue siendo necesario 
en la gestión del espectro. Este capítulo ofrece una metodología para medir el beneficio neto de una re-
atribución de una banda de frecuencias para guiar a reguladores y diseñadores de políticas públicas. Se 
han obtenido los siguientes resultados destacables. 
 Las externalidades asociadas a la provisión de un servicio que utiliza el espectro son relevantes y 
deben incluirse en el cálculo del beneficio o del coste de oportunidad de utilizar o no el 
espectro. 
 
 La demanda de espectro viene determinada por la cantidad y calidad de los servicios finales que 
usan el espectro. En algunos casos, la densidad de población también modifica la intensidad de 
la demanda de espectro. 
 
 El coste de despliegue de las redes que usan el espectro es un elemento clave para determinar 
el valor privado asociado al uso de una banda de frecuencias. Sin embargo, existen otros 
insumos, tales como el número de estaciones desplegadas, o la disponibilidad de otras 
tecnologías que son sustitutas de la utilización de una banda de frecuencias. 
 
 La utilidad de las bandas de frecuencias no es uniforme.  En consecuencia, las bandas de 
frecuencias tienen márgenes de sustitución variables. 
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 La re-atribución de bandas de frecuencias genera costes de transición que deben incluirse en el 
análisis coste beneficio. En algunas ocasiones, la re-atribución puede reducir los costes totales si 
se racionaliza la provisión del servicio existente. 
 
 Pueden obtenerse economías de escala en la fabricación de equipos si la utilización de una 
banda de frecuencias se armoniza en un área geográfica amplia en la que haya un gran número 
de usuarios. 
 
El capítulo 2 analiza el proceso de reforma de la gestión del espectro y la velocidad óptima de 
transformación cuando existe incertidumbre sobre los costes y beneficios de la reforma, el capítulo 
también arroja luz sobre las diferentes políticas para reducir la incertidumbre. Hemos determinado 
cuando elegir una reforma  gradual y una conjunta dependiendo del estado de arte de la tecnología. 
También hemos proporcionado una herramienta para ayudar al regulador a tomar la decisión de 
adoptar inmediatamente una tecnología o esperar a su madurez. La respuesta a ambas cuestiones 
depende de las expectativas sobre el resultado de la reforma, la probabilidad de ocurrencia de los 
escenarios considerados y del coste de volver al estado anterior a la reforma. 
El capítulo 3 presenta un modelo de discriminación del precio que pagan los proveedores de contenidos 
por acceder a internet, en un entorno de competencia en duopolio y diferenciación de producto 
multidimensional en el mercado minorista de acceso a internet. Discutimos el impacto de la 
diferenciación de producto y la discriminación de precios sobre el bienestar total, y ofrecemos 
simulaciones sistemáticas utilizando rangos de valores posibles para los parámetros considerados en el 
modelo de modo que ayuden a discernir el impacto de abandonar la regulación de neutralidad de la red 
sobre el bienestar total. 
Abandonar la regulación de neutralidad de la red produce una reducción significativa del contenido de 
internet susceptible de ser priorizado, mientras que la cantidad de contenido que no es susceptible de 
ser priorizada permanece inalterada. La reducción en la cantidad de contenido es igual en los dos 
escenarios de diversidad de la red considerados en el modelo. En un caso los dos proveedores de acceso 
priorizan y en el otro sólo un proveedor de acceso prioriza el tráfico y el otro no. 
Sin neutralidad de la red, los proveedores de acceso a Internet disfrutan de mayores beneficios gracias a 
la tasa por priorización que cargan a los proveedores de contenidos, pero los proveedores de contenidos 
dispuestos a pagar por la priorización y los anunciantes ven reducido su beneficio. El abandono de la 
neutralidad de la red tiene dos efectos sobre la utilidad de los consumidores. Por un lado, disminuye la 
utilidad como consecuencia de la reducción en la cantidad de contenidos. Por otro lado, aumenta 
porque disminuye el número de paquetes susceptibles de priorización. La simulación es necesaria para 
medir el impacto neto. La simulación muestra que la neutralidad de la red genera un mayor bienestar 
total para los supuestos considerados con los valores dados a los parámetros del modelo. Abandonar la 
neutralidad de la red produce un abrupta caída del beneficio de los consumidores. Este efecto pesa más 
en el bienestar total que el incremento del beneficio del productor de acceso a internet procedente de 
la tasa cargada a los proveedores de contenidos.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The digital transformation taking place in the last decades is a revolution with a deep economic, social, 
and cultural impact. It has created enormous opportunities and also new risks. Growth, enhanced 
productivity, increased citizenship engagement, better democracy and social inclusion are some of the 
opportunities but at the same time these transformations are challenging human and consumer rights, 
social policies and economic efficiency. Reaching the huge potential benefits of the digital revolution 
requires economic analysis to guide new regulations and policies accompanying technological 
advancement.  
The digital dimension of human and constitutional rights must be protected. Digital privacy, online 
freedom of expression or cyber security are examples of regulatory challenges that need to be dealt by 
public authorities to ensure that the digital world has at least the same level of protection of rights than 
the analogue. Where our data is flowing and under what conditions it is stored and manipulated are 
questions whose answer depend the respect for fundamental rights. The internet can be a platform to 
enhance freedom of expression, democracy and citizenship engagement but if institutions are not 
accountable and regulations are not in place it can also be used to increase information control. Thus, 
the internet can be a multiplier or a divider of transparency, democracy and accountability of 
institutions. Security has a new dimension, the protection of digital goods, private data, and the fight 
against cybercrime. The balance between security and privacy is now to be redefined in the digital 
world. 
Regulators also have to cope with new forms of social exclusion. Digital technologies may be a powerful 
tool for inclusion but at the same time of social division. Inclusion stems from the increased availability 
of information and access to public and private services at lesser cost for those that are able to enter the 
digital society. For the others that aren´t, the internet is a new form of exclusion.  Digital literacy and 
policies to help those that can´t afford internet access should be incorporated to social policies in order 
to reduce the digital divide. Besides, the digital revolution is increasing the gap in the jobs market 
between highly educated workers with digital skills and the less educated that usually lack of this type of 
training. The incorporation of academic subjects about digital technologies in education would help to 
reduce this gap, adapting skills to the new jobs of the digital economy. 
Regulations are also necessary for ensuring economic efficiency. The digital transformation impacts the 
economy by creating new goods and services, reducing the cost of accessing, processing and 
understanding information, easing transactions and improving markets performance but if not regulated 
it involves the risk of reduced market competition through the creation of monopoly and monopsony 
power not only in the new digital goods and services markets but also extending market power to 
existing sectors.  
The role of the public sector promoting economic efficiency in the digital age has multiple perspectives. 
Preventing and correcting coordination failure by favoring the adoption of standards and the 
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interoperability of networks and services, defining proper taxation schemes in order to develop digital 
goods and services, providing e-government services, creating public-private partnerships to finance 
network deployment where the private sector either lacks of sufficient funding or incentives to deploy 
the optimal level of infrastructure, designing state aid programs enabling research and development of 
innovative technologies that otherwise would not be carried out. 
Recent industrial organization literature analyzing digital economy related issues focuses on three 
important fields to take account of, the regulation of network deployment and access, the provision of 
digital services and the transactions and interactions among networks, digital services providers, 
consumers and vendors. 
The deployment of digital networks is intrinsically involved in high entry barriers, which hinder effective 
competition, and suboptimal provision due to the existence of externalities. Two are the main reasons 
for entry barriers to exist, the economics of deployment of some network segments and the restricted 
access to a scarce resource, the radio-electric spectrum, which is indispensable for networks providing 
wireless services. 
The economics of digital networks is defined by high sunk cost and scale, scope and density economies. 
The existence of high sunk costs hampers market entry because of the huge financial capacity required 
to build the network. Scale economies make the cost per user drop with higher number of users. 
Markets with strong scale economies tend to be less competitive due to the higher cost per user that 
the entrants have to face compared to the incumbents. With economies of scope the average total cost 
of production decreases when increasing the number of services provided. Scope economies explain 
why fixed and mobile broadband and phone communications are usually offered in a bundle. Companies 
unable to jointly provide the bundle, for example because of lack of access to spectrum, may not enter 
any of these services’ markets. A consequence of scope economies is market concentration. This 
phenomenon has been a salient trend in the last decade. Economies of density make network 
deployment profitable in highly populated areas but cost ineffective in those sparsely populated. As 
spillover effects are not captured by private investors, network supply may be suboptimal without 
regulation. Coverage obligations, network access price regulation and mandated infrastructure sharing 
are several of the regulatory tools available but the design and refining of such regulations in an 
environment of technological evolution still needs more research to be carried out. 
A second regulatory area of importance related to the regulation of networks is spectrum management. 
The radio-electric spectrum is the essential raw material for the provision of digital goods and services. 
Efficient spectrum allocation is hampered by its physical features, the nature of some services using the 
spectrum and inefficiencies of the allocation process. The allocation of spectrum to services has been 
planned by governmental agencies practically since the early days of radio communications. 
Governmental planning has been the response to the complex definition of property rights, high 
enforcement and transaction costs linked to the existence of harmful electromagnetic interferences, 
services that are pure public goods, externalities associated to services, and economies of scale when 
spectrum allocation is harmonized.  
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In the last decades, improved technology enabling services to share the same portion of spectrum, 
better understanding of interference solving and spectrum markets and especially the extraordinary 
growth in the demand for spectrum have put deep pressure to traditional allocation methods. As a 
result, the reform of spectrum has become a salient policy issue and multiple new approaches to 
spectrum management have emerged. Examples of spectrum management reforms are the use of 
auctions to grant licenses, the authorization of secondary market transactions -transfer, leasing, 
mutualisation of usage rights- , the use of administered incentive pricing, spectrum sharing techniques 
and the definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference parameters. 
 
Dealing with market power in the provision of digital services is another research field of interest. In this 
case, market power is generated in the demand side instead of supply. Utility obtained by consumers 
from the consumption of digital goods and services increases with the number of users using the same 
service. This fact results in market concentration in one or in a few providers. Additionally, transaction 
costs of buying goods using digital services are lower than those using traditional means. If the provision 
of digital goods is concentrated, market power can be extended to traditional sectors from the side of 
the digital demand. Both factors support the creation of monopsony power. These effects combined 
may generate two adverse consequences, new digital companies attempting to enter the market will 
face increased barriers and consumers would find higher switching costs. 
 
Finally, the transactions and interactions among network providers, digital services providers, 
consumers and vendors raise difficult questions about the optimal prices to remunerate all involved 
parties efficiently. Most of the goods of the digital revolution are provided through two sided markets. 
These types of markets involve two different classes of customers, and a vendor, the platform, that 
enables transactions. Network providers are a platform for the transactions among internet users and 
internet content aggregators. At the same time, content aggregators, are a platform for the transactions 
among content providers and internet users. This complex structure together with reduced competition, 
potential monopoly power in network provision and monopsony power in the provision of services, 
difficult the optimal provision of digital goods and services. 
This thesis proposes regulations and strategies for the economic efficiency and the optimal provision of 
digital networks, goods and services contributing to some of the topics of focus in recent literature. One 
field of interest is entry barriers to companies selling internet access. We contribute to the literature by 
analyzing the efficient allocation of spectrum, one of the entry barriers’ causes, and the optimal path 
and speed of spectrum management reform. Another field on interest is the calculation of the optimal 
prices to remunerate network providers, digital service providers, consumers and vendors. We 
contribute to the literature by examining the impact of price discrimination of internet service providers 
under duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail broadband access. 
The thesis is structured in two blocks. The first block has two chapters. It focuses on spectrum 
management as a key input for the supply of digital networks and consequently for the provision of 
digital goods and services. We first tackle the problem from a wide ranged angle, considering spectrum 
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management as a field of steady progress and permanent change, approaching this field to the arena of 
the political economy analysis of reform. We expand the model of Dewatripont and Roland (1995) 
adding the idiosyncrasies of spectrum management and replacing political uncertainness by the 
uncertainty generated by unknown costs and benefits of spectrum management reform. Secondly, we 
analyze how to approach a specific and significant reform case, one where the regulator needs to 
ascertain the most efficient solution to re-allocate a highly demanded portion of spectrum with an 
incumbent user, new candidates to use the spectrum and associated externalities. We propose a 
methodology to analyze the efficiency of the allocation of spectrum to a radio-communication service in 
such types of spectrum bands and situations. 
The second block has one extensive chapter. It discusses the optimal regulation of the price to access 
the internet in a context of imperfect competition, which is the common market structure. Our setup 
departs from the model described by Liu and Shuai (2015) with multi-dimensional product 
differentiation of the internet access product. One dimension is related to the set of products bundled 
to internet access. The other, represents how users value package delay or a delay variation that may 
worsen the quality of some internet services and applications. We consider the possibility of price 
discriminating providers of digital content when they buy internet connectivity. Our goal is to determine 
the price structure maximizing total welfare. Our model uses a sequential moves game theoretic 
approach to analyze total welfare implications of price discrimination. Finally, we offer systematic 
simulations, whose objective is to fill the gaps that cannot be easily explained using only mathematical 
analysis. 
The content of each Chapter of this thesis can be briefly summarized as follows: 
Chapter 1: Some proposals for the evaluation of the efficient allocation of spectrum for radio 
communication service. New approaches to spectrum management have resulted in more efficient 
production of services enabling better quality of service, a reduction of the used amount of spectrum, 
increased coverage and reduced prices. However, the role of the public sector is still essential in 
spectrum allocation. Technology advancement and improvements of the licensing methods must be 
complemented with processes of reallocation led by the public sector enabling higher allocative 
efficiency of resources. This chapter provides a methodology to measure the net benefit of the 
reallocation of a spectrum band intended to guide regulators and policy makers. 
Chapter 2: Path and speed of spectrum management reform under associated uncertain costs and 
benefits. The question in spectrum management is no longer if reform is necessary to give market more 
participation but the path and speed of reform with current and expected technology advance. This 
chapter aims to contribute to answer this question offering a model to ascertain the optimal speed of 
reform and shed some light on the policy options to reduce uncertainty in the associated costs and 
benefits of reform. 
In this chapter, we analyze reform types and the associated uncertainty stemming from the intrinsic 
physical features of spectrum and the insufficient internalization of technology advancements in 
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regulations. We discuss how existing and upcoming technology may help overcome market failure and 
uncertainness. 
Chapter 3: Price discrimination of over the top providers under duopolistic competition and multi-
dimensional product differentiation in retail broadband access. Network neutrality regulation prevents 
price discrimination from access providers to content providers and product differentiation in terms of 
connection quality in the retail broadband access market. This chapter analyzes the economic 
implications of price discrimination under duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional product 
differentiation in retail internet access using a sequential-moves game theoretic model. Under this 
framework, we discuss the impact of product differentiation and price discrimination on social welfare, 
and offer systematic simulations using feasible ranges for parameters value to help discern the impact of 
departing from network neutrality regulation on social welfare. 
Finally we offer some conclusions and suggest extensions and future research. 
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Abstract: New approaches to spectrum management have enabled a more efficient provision and better 
quality of services, a reduction of the amount of spectrum required, increased coverage and reduced 
prices. However, the role of the public sector is still essential in spectrum allocation and management. 
Technology advancement and improvements in the licensing procedures must be complemented with 
processes of reallocation led by the public sector enabling higher allocative efficiency of resources. This 
paper provides a methodology to measure the net benefit of the reallocation of a spectrum band 
intended to guide regulators and policy makers in the process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The radio-electric spectrum, a subset of the electromagnetic waves, is the essential raw material for the 
provision of a myriad of different services of increasing importance for the economy and society. Some 
spectrum usages are well-known and extensively consumed like radio, television, mobile voice 
communications and broadband. National defense, emergency assistance and scientific research are 
also users of spectrum. Future expected applications include telemedicine diagnosis and treatment, 
automated vehicles, monitoring of electricity and water networks for a sustainable consumption and 
efficient traffic management solutions and transportation systems. The list of services and applications 
is growing and spectrum use is changing the economy and society. Many of the economic and social 
benefits of the digital transformation taking place would not be possible without an efficient allocation 
of spectrum to different services. 
 
Efficient spectrum allocation is hampered by its physical features and the nature of some services using 
the spectrum. Physical features have been the underpinning rationale for public management of 
allocation. For example, the potential existence of harmful electromagnetic interference among 
spectrum users obstructs proper definition and enforcement of property rights and secondary market 
transactions. Interferences may happen between users providing different services, intra service 
interference, or among providers of the same service, inter service interference. Besides, there exist 
services that are pure public goods, externalities associated to services and economies of scale that can 
only be leveraged when spectrum allocation is harmonized. However, more efficient approaches and 
procedures and higher market participation in spectrum management and allocation has been early and 
consistently proposed; Coase (1959, 1960), Levin (1970), Hazlett (1998, 2003), Kwerel and Williams 
(2002), Baumol and Robyn (2006).  
 
Scarcity brought about by the huge growth in the demand for spectrum, especially in some bands 
demand clearly exceeds supply, has led to a consensus among regulators and stakeholders on the 
benefits of lighter regulation and higher flexibility in license conditions. As a result, many significant 
developments in spectrum management have taken place recently. Such changes are expected to 
reduce the cost and the speed of the deployment of networks carrying new valuable services and 
applications. The use of auctions to grant licenses, technology change without prior administrative 
authorization, and the allowance of secondary market transactions, such as transfers, leases, spectrum 
licenses pooling and the mutualisation of usage rights are examples of new approaches to spectrum 
management that are usual recommendations for inclusion on Digital National Strategies, see 
Broadband Commission (2014, 2016). This new possibilities in the allocation process have resulted in a 
more efficient production of services enabling better quality, a reduction of the amount of spectrum 
required to provide services, increased coverage and reduced prices. However, developments intended 
to achieve better allocation of services into portions of spectrum, such as spectrum sharing techniques 
or the definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference parameters still has a long way to 
efficiently enable the market to carry out intra service transactions of usage rights. The impact of 
sharing  is diminished because it is limited to some extent to short range applications, and acceptable 
interference licenses because more research is still required for and effective definition that reduces 
huge transaction uncertainty. 
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In this context, the role of the public sector as the agent coordinating the reallocation of frequencies to 
services with higher social value is still essential in spectrum management. New spectrum availability 
brought about by technology advancement, shared use of spectrum or a more efficient use of currently 
allocated frequencies must be complemented with processes of reallocation with well-defined and 
transparent transactions and reduced uncertainty for both the incumbent and the entrants to a new 
portion of available spectrum. The purpose of public sector intervention is to introduce certainty in 
transactions, ensuring the production of public goods and enabling the generation of the external value 
associated to services. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to measure the social value of using a spectrum band for one or more 
services. Bazelon and McHenery (2013), Alden (2012), Prasad (2014) and Cave et al (2016) added to the 
definition of methodologies for estimating the value of spectrum taking account of externalities linked 
to services. While these studies analyzed how to measure social value from a static point of view, we 
focus on measuring the resulting value of the dynamic process of reallocating a spectrum band 
previously used by one or more incumbent services planned to be also used by one or more entrants. 
 
This paper is structured as follows, section 2 analyzes current spectrum management models, section 3 
describes the new models available that may increase the efficiency of spectrum use, section 4 offers a 
methodology to evaluate the social value of the reallocation of a portion of spectrum and section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Spectrum management models 
 
Spectrum management is shaped by the physical features of wave propagation and by the nature of 
services using the spectrum. A single management model is not possible for all frequency bands because 
separate bands have different features which mold the way in which frequencies are allocated and 
managed. Additionally, the use of spectrum is an input for the provision of services but not the only 
possible solution. The allocation of additional spectrum to a service may be substituted by the 
deployment of dense networks with a higher number of radio stations but with increased cost of 
network deployment. 
 
Frequency bands are different in terms of their capacity to cover a geographical area and the amount of 
information that are capable to carry. In general, higher frequencies cover less extended areas but 
instead can transport more information. Alternatively, low frequencies help to minimize the number of 
stations required to provide some services because they can cover larger areas, thus reducing the cost 
of network deployment. Consequently, only a portion of the radio-electric spectrum has physical 
features enabling at the same time enough capacity to carry reasonable amount of information with 
limited network deployment costs. These bands are highly demanded and service providers are willing 
to pay more to have access to such bands. 
 
Spectrum can be used to provide a huge variety of services. The suitability of a frequency band to 
provide a service depends on the nature of the service being provided. Whereas some require high 
transmitting power like broadcasting, others are intended to provide short ranged applications. If the 
service is intended to provide communication services, requirements are different for communication 
between persons or machines and for one-way or multidirectional. The provision of some services 
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require the allocation of a combination of different portions of spectrum, including high frequencies in 
urban locations to serve densely populated areas and low frequencies in rural locations to maximize the 
coverage of each station if population is spread out. 
 
Spectrum management is carried out from both, international and national public institutions. 
International agreements are required because without coordination between countries many spectrum 
usages may interfere with services of neighboring countries. For example, the frequencies used by a 
country to provide a television channel in a border area may not be used by a neighbor in the areas of its 
country near the border. Consequently, coordination of spectrum allocation and cooperation among 
countries ease the deployment of telecommunication networks. When neighbors use the spectrum in 
the same way the probability of interference is reduced and the agreements to distribute frequencies 
between countries in border areas are much easier to reach. Besides, coordination of allocation reduce 
the cost of providing services because the higher the number devices using the same portion of 
spectrum the higher the economies of scale in the manufacturing of the electronic communication 
components. 
 
A specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), is 
responsible for the registration of internationally recognized allocations in the table of frequency 
allocations. An allocation is the registration of a particular frequency band to be used for a particular 
service. Additionally, there is a registration of allotments and assignments. An allotment is the right to 
use a particular frequency of the allocated band in a geographical area. An assignment identifies a 
particular radio-station defining not only the frequency being used but also a set of conditions, such the 
location, the transmission power and the direction of emission. The ITU is also responsible for the 
elaboration of the Radio Regulations, an international treaty ratified by ITU Member States, which 
contains inter alia rules for spectrum usage and rules of procedure to change allocations, allotments and 
assignments. Radio regulations are reviewed periodically in the World Radio Communication 
conferences in order to accommodate new services and technologies in unused bands and promoting 
the reallocation of existing services. 
       
Nationally, each country can allocate the spectrum within their borders according to national 
preferences provided that usages differential with respect to the international allocations don’t cause 
harmful interference to services of neighboring countries functioning according the international table. 
Consequently, it is necessary to consult not only the international table of frequency allocations but also 
the national table1 to find out how a particular frequency is being used in a country 
 
The term service in spectrum management carries multiple meanings. It may refer to the engineering 
concept of radio communication service, which is defined as a service involving the transmission, 
emission and/or reception of radio waves2. Understood as such, radio-communication services are 
classified according to the nature of the transmitter and/or receivers and the communication features. 
Examples are the mobile service, the land mobile-satellite service, the broadcasting service, the fixed 
service etc. In a different context, the term service can be used to describe the functionality that the 
spectrum usage is intended to provide. For example, television, voice telephony, internet access, etc. 
Finally, it can be associated to the administrative license required. As so, services can be of exclusive 
use, collective use, shared use etc.  Within the latter definition, there are several types of spectrum 
licenses which define different kinds of spectrum use. 
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 Collective use of spectrum: Bands designated for collective use can be utilized without 
administrative license by anyone. Devices using such bands must comply with a set of 
standardized technical requirements. Harmful interference among devices is prevented by 
the fulfillment of the standard and the short ranged nature of transmissions. Collective 
usages are normally intended to provide short ranged applications that usually don´t exceed 
a few meters which limits the probability of interference. Examples of applications are in 
home internet wireless distribution via Wi-Fi, communication of nearby devices via 
Bluetooth or RFID applications such as payments with smartphones. Longer ranged 
applications are possible but much less common. An example is the provision of commercial 
internet access via Wi-Fi technologies.  
 
 Exclusive use of spectrum for commercial purposes. Bands designated for exclusive use can 
only be utilized for those that have previously obtained an administrative grant. There exists 
a variety of applications and several types of licenses. Interference among commercial users 
is prevented by defining in the license the technical conditions under which the radio 
stations will operate. Frequencies allocated for commercial purposes may be used for the 
provision of services to the public, like television or wireless broadband access, or be the 
support of corporate activities whose goal is the production of a commercial good or a 
service. Examples of supporting activities are wireless transportation of data with radio links 
or the deployment of private communication networks not publicly available. In some cases, 
especially in those where applications are intended to provide services to the public, 
demand for frequencies greatly exceeds supply. In such situations, licenses are normally 
granted using competitive processes like auctions or public tenders. 
 
 Exclusive use of spectrum for public purposes. These bands are also designated for exclusive 
use but unlike those described in the previous paragraph, applications are pure public 
goods, usually can waive any spectrum access or usage fee and are normally provided using 
public funding. Another differential feature is that bargaining power of public users is lower 
in case of interference disputes with private applications because of the public nature of the 
services being provided; high social value and no financial revenue. 
 
 Shared use of spectrum. The shared use of spectrum is an innovative approach to spectrum 
management where the incumbent users of a spectrum band which is allocated to be used 
exclusively, share the frequencies with entrants operating under a well-defined set of 
technical conditions. These conditions are defined in order to avoid harmful interference to 
existing services. After the introduction of the shared use, both the incumbents and the 
entrants are able to provide certain quality of service previously defined.  
 
Licenses define the spectrum management model. In practice, the four types presented above coexist in 
different frequency bands. Some authors have studied these models to ascertain which one is the most 
efficient. Faulhaber, G.R. (2005) analyzes these models in terms of the capacity of the system to allocate 
the spectrum to those that value it the most, the minimization of transaction costs, the availability of 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts of interference and the capacity to adopt new technologies. He 
concludes that the exclusive use of spectrum complemented by competitive processes like auctions to 
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allocate frequencies is the most efficient model and proposes that even the provision of public services 
depends on the purchase of exclusive property rights. However, other authors, Cave, M. (2002), ITU 
(2009) claim that auctions as the only allocation model is not an efficient allocation because the 
definition of efficiency should include social considerations such as the existence of externalities and 
pure public goods. Others have suggested collective use as a competing alternative to the exclusive use 
for the provision of services, Noam (1998), Benkler (2002), Werbach (2004). Collective use of spectrum 
has very low entry barriers and it has been associated to a boost to innovation but this way has not been 
explored or has not been successfully enough to be standardized at a large scale. An alternative solution 
is the exclusive use of spectrum complemented with administered incentive pricing, which consist of 
charging a fee to spectrum users based on the opportunity cost of using this portion of spectrum, Smith-
Nera(1996), Independen et al (2004) and Cave, Doyle and Webb (2007). 
  
3. New approaches to spectrum management  
 
New spectrum management approaches are intended to ease technology migration, reduce transaction 
costs and achieve an efficient provision of services. Some proposed drastic changes to current 
management procedures. For example, Faulhaber, G.R. (2005) suggested substituting public allocation 
and management of spectrum by the definition of exclusive property rights and trust in law 
enforcement in courts to solve conflicts of interference among parties. The regulator would only be 
responsible for the definition of property rights including the description of the technical features 
associated to the use of a frequency band. However, this approach does not take account of the 
potential under provision of pure public goods or how to include new forms of interference caused by 
new technologies in the definition of property rights. A list of more gradual and already implemented 
new approaches to spectrum management is offered below. 
 
 Enabling secondary market transactions like transfers, leasing, and the mutualisation of all or a part 
of the spectrum license 
 Enabling technology migration without prior administrative authorization 
 Using auctions as a method of ensuring productive efficiency 
 Introducing incentive administered pricing which consist of charging a fee to spectrum users based 
on the opportunity cost of using the spectrum they have allocated. 
 Enabling the shared use of spectrum.  
 Defining licenses in terms of acceptable interference to reduce the cost of future transactions of 
spectrum in the secondary market.  
 
The optimal management approach for each portion of spectrum must be analyzed on a case by case 
basis. For some bands, the introduction of secondary market transactions may be the most efficient 
measure but in other cases a better course of action may be to enable technology change in licenses so 
that the adoption of new technologies is not delayed.   
 
One salient example of a reallocation process carried out using new approaches to spectrum 
management is the migration from analogue to digital television and the subsequent allocation of the 
newly available frequencies to mobile broadband. The provision of television services with digital 
technologies resulted in at least fourfold reduction of the amount of spectrum required to broadcast a 
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television channel with analogue technologies. The new spectrum made available by the migration to 
digital is usually referred as the digital dividend. The digital dividend was used not only to increase the 
number of television channels but also to allocate the remaining spectrum to a new service, mobile 
broadband, via auctions. During the transition period, a repackaging process of the frequencies used by 
broadcasters was necessary in order to make available a contiguous set of frequencies for the provision 
of mobile broadband services. 
 
Many studies were carried out on this topic in order to determine how much spectrum of the digital 
dividend should remain for the provision of television services and how much to be allocated to mobile 
broadband. Costs benefit analysis was carried out by Analysis Mason et al (2009), Spectrum Value 
Partners (2008) and Ofcom (2006). All of them focused on the valuation of the private value of the 
allocation of an additional unit of spectrum to each service. However, none offer a systematic approach 
to take account of the value of externalities associated to services. The first study lack of the inclusion of 
externalities in the analysis and the other two consider that the external value of the analyzed services is 
a tenth of the private value but don´t offer the rationale for such conclusion. However, the external 
value of services may be a significant part of the spectrum value. For  example, many studies associate 
the provision of broadband to productivity increase and economic growth, Gillet, S. et al (2006), Litan y 
Rivlin (2001), Goss (2001), López Sánchez et al (2004, 2006) and ESADE (2012). An additional 
shortcoming of these studies is that they neither include the analysis of the cost of the potential 
interference problems that may happen during the reallocation process.  
   
 
4. Methodology to evaluate the efficiency of the reallocation of a portion of spectrum 
used by incumbent users  
 
 
We offer a methodology to evaluate total welfare of a reallocation of spectrum. Such methodology is 
useful to analyze different alternatives and it helps to determine the most efficient allocation of a 
spectrum band that is currently being underused. New spectrum management approaches normally 
lead to situations of underutilization of spectrum because ease the adoption of new technologies and 
reduce intra-service transaction costs making new portions of spectrum available for new allocations.  
 
There are several circumstances leading to the reallocation of services into new available frequencies. 
One possible scenario is the adoption of a new technology enabling the provision of a service with fewer 
amount of spectrum. In such cases, the spectrum surplus may be distributed between the current users 
and entrants with higher social value. The problem here is to determine the most efficient solution 
taking account of the two relevant dimensions of the problem. One is which new entrants should have 
access to the new frequencies. The other is how much of the spectrum available should be allocated to 
the entrant services and kept for the incumbents. The final goal is to allocate the spectrum in such a way 
that the marginal benefit obtained through the allocation of spectrum to the entrant equals the 
marginal opportunity cost of the incumbent relinquishing a portion of the spectrum and accepting 
potential interference problems. The costs of the transition period should also be included in the cost 
benefit analysis calculation. The marginal value of a frequency unit is the additional cost borne or 
avoided by an efficient user of spectrum when it renounces or it is enabled to use an additional unit of 
spectrum. 
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Another probable scenario is the identification of a band to be shared among several users, the 
incumbent user and one or more entrants. This scenario is to be considered if the expected benefits of 
spectrum sharing exceed the associated costs. The use of the same band by two or more different 
services may require technical and regulatory arrangements to ensure that both, the incumbent and the 
entrant services are provided with sufficient quality.  
 
The value of each of the alternatives considered in the evaluation of the most efficient allocation 
depends on the expected demand for services, the current deployment of networks -it is easier to 
deploy networks in neighboring frequencies- and the potential substitutes of the analyzed band. The 
substitutability of a spectrum band is a key element in the evaluation of alternatives since in some cases 
spectrum can be an optional input but in others it may be the only technical and financial available 
solution to provide a service. Factors such as the land layout, network topology and the technology used 
to provide the service have an impact on the frequency reuse distance, thus in the existence of 
alternative inputs substituting the spectrum. 
 
There are some important facts to take account of in the evaluation of alternatives. For example, there 
are decreasing marginal returns to the allocation of spectrum to services. The marginal benefit that can 
be obtained through an additional allocation to a service diminishes when the total amount of spectrum 
allocated increases. Furthermore, the utility of the spectrum is variable and depends on the portion of 
spectrum being considered. Some portions are in great demand and consequently have higher prices. 
Finally, another important fact is that the provision of some services requires the use of different 
portions of spectrum. In such cases, there will be variable substitution margins for each band. 
 
When a service is deprived of a portion of spectrum or it has to share it, there is a cost. The opportunity 
cost of renouncing to use a frequency band is the cost that a spectrum user has to borne as a result of 
not being able to use this frequency. The cost of sharing a frequency with an entrant is the expenditure 
made by the incumbent to maintain the same level and quality of service when the entrant have access 
to the use of this frequency.  Opportunity cost calculations should include capital and operational 
expenditure considering all the potential substitutes of spectrum. 
 
In some cases it may not be possible to provide similar quality of service or coverage to the same 
amount of people with a reduced portion of spectrum. In such cases, demand will not be met and there 
will be a reduction of income that should be included in the calculation of the opportunity cost. 
Additionally, there may also be externalities not enjoyed that should also be added to the calculations. 
The alternative with lower cost is the one that should be accounted in the calculations. The following are 
substitutes of using a frequency band. 
 
 Providing the service using an available frequency that is less demanded. 
 Employing other inputs that can replace the use of spectrum. For example, deploying denser 
networks or building wired systems where it is possible. 
 Migrating to a new technology that uses the spectrum more efficiently. 
 
Reallocation of spectrum is conditioned by the size of the frequency band required to provide the 
entrant service. Consequently, it depends on the availability of a sufficient amount of spectrum to 
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accommodate the new service. In addition to that, the creation of guard bands of unused spectrum 
between services to avoid interference among them it is usually required. Furthermore, the full-fledged 
operation of an entrant service for effective competition to exist should be enough to accommodate 
several service providers. All these requisites need to be   contemplated when considering the allocation 
of spectrum to a new service. 
 
Existing infrastructure and frequency allocations are relevant parameters to determine how beneficial it 
is the new allocation to a service. The cost of using a new frequency band is heavily reduced when there 
exists infrastructure using nearby frequency bands. Cost saving stems from the possibility to share the 
passive infrastructure, e.g. towers, rights of way, and even active infrastructure, e.g. antennas. 
Furthermore, receiving devices are cheaper to produce because of similarities in the manufacturing 
process that enable to take advantage of the economies of scale.  Consequently, a successful analysis of 
the most suitable service to be allocated in a newly available spectrum should include the study of the 
bands that have already been allocated to this service and the infrastructure that has already been built 
using frequencies close to the new allocation. Conversely, when an incumbent service is forced to 
renounce to some frequencies that are currently in use, the cost of using less frequencies will be 
minimized if the service can keep part of the reallocated band. This is because existing infrastructure can 
be re-used, thus, reducing the impact of the reallocation. 
 
The external value generated by services is an important element to add in the cost benefit analysis of a 
reallocation of spectrum. Externalities can be associated not only to the public usage of spectrum but 
also to commercial services. Furthermore, externalities are associated not only to the availability but 
also to the quality of service. Some spectrum usages, for example those provided by electronic 
communication networks (ECN), can suffer congestion in areas with high population density. When 
networks are congested quality of service declines and demand cannot be met resulting in a loss of both 
external and private value. Congestion can be solved with the allocation of additional spectrum and/or 
the deployment of new infrastructure because these factors determine the number of stations per unit 
area. The optimal size of infrastructure/spectrum allocation is that which enable to meet demand 
making marginal cost of consumption zero under the assumption that meeting demand is profitable for 
the company providing the service. When it is not financially profitable but still socially desirable 
coverage obligations should be set in spectrum licenses in order to take advantage of the external value 
of service provision. 
 
The net benefit of a reallocation scenario depends on the benefits obtained by the entrants, including 
the private and the external value associated to the use of spectrum, the cost borne by the incumbents, 
the opportunity cost of not using the available band for other purposes and the cost incurred during the 
transition from the existing allocation to the new one. We offer a methodology to analyze the efficiency 
of the reallocation of spectrum to radio-communication services. 
 
The benefit gained from the allocation of   new services into a portion of spectrum that is already 
allocated to  incumbent users can be derived from expressions 1 and 2. 
 
  ∑  
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Where 
 
    is the total benefit obtained from allocating  new services  
  is the number of new services to be allocated in the analyzed portion of spectrum 
     is the value of the additional externalities gained from the allocation of spectrum to    
     is the private value gained from the allocation of spectrum to   
 
 
The cost borne by   incumbent spectrum users when their portion of spectrum is also allocated to   
new services is described by the following expression. 
 
 
  ∑  
 
   
          
Where 
    
 
   is the total cost of allocating  new services 
  is the number of incumbents using the analyzed portion of spectrum 
     is the loss of external value  from  the incumbent   due to the re-allocation  
     is the private value missed by an incumbent    in the re-allocation  
     is the cost borne by   during the transition period when a new service is allocated 
     is the private value added through productive efficiency gained by   when a new service is 
allocated 
 
Total welfare obtained from a spectrum re-allocation is defined by the following expression 
 
       
 
    
In the following sections we analyze the elements of each of the benefit and costs components and offer 
flowcharts to help determine the components of the cost benefit analysis. 
 
4.1 Value of the additional externalities gained from the allocation of spectrum to new 
services 
 
In the calculation of the external value of the reallocation of a frequency band we consider the lowest 
value among these two; the net positive externality associated to the allocation to a new radio 
communication service or the cost of building infrastructure for this service to meet demand up to the 
point where the marginal consumption is zero or demand is completely met. 
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Figure 1.1: External benefit of spectrum re-allocation 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
4.2 Private benefit of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service 
 
The private benefit of the allocation of spectrum to an entrant service should be calculated for several 
scenarios considering alternatives for the expected demand and for the existing substitutive inputs of 
the analyzed band. Producer surplus of service providers should only be included in the calculations in 
case demand can only be met if the band is allocated. In such cases, it would be added only the 
additional surplus attributable to the new allocation. If the consumer surplus is not added in the 
calculation, the net private benefit is the cost saved in the provision of the service stemming from the 
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allocation of the band. Savings might come from capital or operative expenses. Its magnitude depends 
on the existing infrastructure, the frequencies already allocated to this service, the economies of scale 
that can be achieved in the manufacture of devices and cost savings gained in service provision.  
 
Economies of scale in the manufacture of the equipment required to use a frequency band can be 
captured if the band is planned to be allocated in a harmonized way across a large geographical area 
with high expected number of customers. Cost savings stem from the reduction of the research and 
development cost per unit of the electronic parts required to use the band and the reduction in the 
number and complexity of the components embedded in communication devices.  If new frequencies 
are close to those already being used there may be additional cost savings and a reduction of the 
launching time of new equipment because of the similarity of the new devices with existing ones. Just in 
time availability of devices is a key element to the successful implementation of the new allocation. 
Normally, the benefits of the economies of scale are distributed among final users and equipment 
manufacturers. 
 
Besides the cost reductions in device manufacturing, economies of scale may also apply to service 
provision. For example, the services provided by ECN can be used by customers visiting a foreign 
country3 only if the devices released in their home country share the frequency bands with those in the 
visited country. Only if such condition is met, service providers can reach roaming agreements to enable 
service provision abroad. Consumers benefit from the harmonized allocation because they obtain higher 
utility from the services purchased. The surplus for producers comes from the increased number of 
consumers demanding the service, country visitors, and from the demand of additional services of local 
consumers when travelling abroad. 
 
Spectrum allocation save operative and capital expenditure because of the following reasons. It avoids 
the construction of new sites to meet demand where the network is congested. It can heavily reduce the 
cost of deploying networks when there exists infrastructure using nearby frequencies because of the 
possibility to share most of the passive infrastructure and part of the active. Cost savings amount to the 
differential cost of providing the service with and without the band. Both, the possibility of providing the 
service with other frequency bands and other inputs different than the spectrum should be considered 
in the calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 José Marino García García - Regulations and Strategies for the Digital Transformation                                                                     31 
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Some proposals for the evaluation of the efficiency of an allocation of spectrum to radio-communication 
services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Private benefit of spectrum re-allocation 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
4.3 Private cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service borne by an 
incumbent service 
 
The private cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant, is the opportunity cost of not 
allocating the band to the incumbent or to a different service. Cost calculations should take account of 
scenarios of the expected demand of the incumbent service and the alternative inputs substituting the 
analyzed band. 
 
Producer surplus loss should be included in the opportunity cost calculation if the allocation of the band 
to a new service results in a reduction of the existing supply that cannot be solved by using an 
alternative input. If it is possible to mitigate the reduced supply with another input, the cost of using this 
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new input should also be included in the calculation. Besides, if the abandonment of the band reduce 
the current or future expected economies of scale in manufacturing devices or in service provision, 
these cost also should be accounted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Private cost of spectrum re-allocation 
 
Source: Authors 
 
4.4 External cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service borne by an 
incumbent service 
 
The external cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant, is the loss of external benefit not 
enjoyed because of the allocation of the band to a different service. If the allocation of the band to a 
new service results in a reduction of the existing supply that cannot be solved with the use of an 
alternative input, the external benefit loss should be included in the opportunity cost calculations. If 
instead it is possible to mitigate the reduced supply with another input, the cost of using this additional 
input should be included in the calculations.  
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Figure 1.4: External cost of spectrum re-allocation 
 
Source: Authors 
 
4.5 Cost associated to the transition to a new spectrum allocation 
 
There exist transition costs associated to the reallocation of spectrum to a new entrant service. For the 
process to be beneficial these costs must be lower than the benefits accrued by the reallocation. 
Transition cost may be one or several of the following.  
 
 Costs of repackaging frequencies used by the incumbent service to make available a sufficient 
and adjacent amount of spectrum to be usable by the entrant. Such repackaging activities may 
imply the adaptation of transmitting stations and/or receiving devices to change the frequency 
that is currently being used.  
 Operating expenses stemming from the provision of services in the new and old frequencies in 
order to avoid service interruption during the transition period.  
 Minimizing harmful interferences that may appear during the deployment of the entrant’s 
network. 
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 Costs associated to the loss of coverage. These costs that may be solved by using alternative 
inputs such as other frequency bands or inputs different than the spectrum.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: Cost of transition to a new spectrum allocation 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
4.6 Private benefits gained by the incumbent service when reallocating a spectrum band  
 
There may be benefits for the incumbent associated to the reallocation of spectrum to a new entrant 
service. The reallocation of frequencies might result in the streamlining of frequency usage and service 
provision reducing operative and capital expenditure. We expect these cost reductions to be several 
orders of magnitude lower than the opportunity costs incurred by not using the band. Furthermore, if 
there is a reduction in the number of customers that cannot be solved using another frequency or input, 
the opportunity cost of the reduced supply should be minored by the reduction on capital and operative 
expenditure. 
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Figure 1.6: Private benefit gained by the incumbent with a spectrum re-allocation 
 
Source: Authors 
 
The steps required to apply this methodology are the following 
 
 Identifying a frequency band candidate to be reallocated. Potential candidates are bands where 
a new technology is either available or already being introduced and bands suitable to be 
identified for shared use. 
 Identifying the geographical area where the analysis will take place. 
 Defining the parameters of the cost benefit analysis. Namely the time horizon, the discount 
factor and other relevant parameters. 
 Selecting the entrant services that are suitable candidates to use the new available spectrum. 
There may be several candidates. All of them should be included in the analysis 
 Generating demand scenarios for each service including not only current but also expected 
demand behavior. Demand for spectrum is driven by the quantity and quality of service. For 
some services population density is also a driver of spectrum demand.  
 Defining a production function for each service under consideration describing how network 
deployment costs vary with the allocation of frequencies of different portions of the spectrum 
and with the number of base stations and other inputs. 
 Generating the scenarios for potential alternative frequency bands an inputs substituting the 
allocation of the analyzed band. 
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 Calculating the value of the additional externalities gained from the allocation of spectrum to 
new services 
 Calculating private benefit of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service 
 Calculating the opportunity cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service borne 
by an incumbent service 
 Calculating the external cost of reallocating a spectrum band to a new entrant service borne by 
an incumbent service 
 Calculating the cost of transition to a new allocation  
 Calculating the private benefits gained by the incumbent service when reallocating a spectrum 
band 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The radio-electric spectrum is the essential raw material for the provision of many digital goods and 
services. These services are changing the economy and society but the benefits of the digital 
transformation taking place would not be possible without an efficient allocation of spectrum to radio-
communication services. 
 
Public management of spectrum allocation is supported by the intrinsic physical features of the 
spectrum and the nature of some services. Namely, the potential existence of harmful electromagnetic 
interference among spectrum users, services that are pure public goods, externalities associated to 
services and economies of scale that can only be leveraged when spectrum allocation is harmonized. 
However, more efficient approaches and higher market participation in spectrum management has been 
early and consistently proposed in existing literature.  
 
Spectrum scarcity, especially in certain bands, has led to a consensus among regulators and market 
agents on the benefits of lighter regulation and higher flexibility in license conditions in order to reduce 
the cost and speed of network deployments. As a result, many significant developments in spectrum 
management have taken place. Licenses enabling technology change, the authorization of secondary 
market transactions and the use of auctions, among other new approaches to spectrum management, 
have resulted in a more efficient production of services enabling better quality of service, a reduction of 
the amount of spectrum required, increased coverage and reduced prices. 
 
However, the role of the public sector is still essential in spectrum allocation in spite of the 
advancements in techniques to increase allocative efficiency, e.g. shared use of spectrum and the 
definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference. Technology advancement providing new 
spectrum resources and improvements in the licensing methods must be complemented with processes 
of reallocation led by the public sector enabling higher allocative efficiency of resources. These 
processes should be designed to achieve more transparent transactions and reduced uncertainty for 
both the incumbent and the entrants to the new portion of available spectrum. 
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This paper provides a methodology to measure the net benefit of the reallocation of a spectrum band 
intended to guide regulators and policy makers. After the reallocation, the band will be used by the 
incumbent and new entrant services. We have identified the following facts.  
 
 The calculation of the benefits and of the opportunity costs of spectrum usage should include 
the external value associated to the provision of services in cases where externalities can only 
be obtained using the studied frequency band. 
 
 Demand for spectrum is driven by the quantity and quality of services consumed. For some 
services the population density is also a driver of spectrum demand.  
 
 The cost of deploying networks to use the spectrum is a key element to determine the private 
value associated to the use of a frequency band. Deployment costs may be approximated by 
using production functions. The production function should be composed by several input 
arguments one of which is the spectrum. There are other inputs such as the number of stations 
or the use of wired solutions that may be substitutes of a frequency band. If the service is using 
other frequencies all of them should be included in the analysis. 
 
 The utility of spectrum usage is variable. It depends on the portion of spectrum being 
considered. Some portions are in great demand and have higher prices. Different portions of 
spectrum are not perfect substitutes one another, consequently, frequencies have variable 
substitution margins. The allocation of frequencies with similar features produces decreasing 
marginal returns. The key goal of spectrum management is to allocate the spectrum so that the 
marginal benefit obtained through the allocation of spectrum to the entrant equals the marginal 
opportunity cost of the incumbent relinquishing a portion of spectrum. 
 
 Reallocation of spectrum produces transition costs that should be included in the cost benefit 
analysis. The cost of transition may include the adaptation of transmitting stations and/or 
receiving devices in order to change the frequencies currently in use. Operating expenses stem 
from the provision of services in the new and old frequencies to avoid service interruption 
during the transition period, costs of minimizing harmful interferences during the deployment of 
the entrant’s network and costs associated to coverage losses. Sometimes the reallocation may 
also reduce costs if the provision of the incumbent service and the use of frequencies can be 
streamlined. 
 
 Economies of scale in the manufacture of the equipment required to use a frequency band can 
be gained if the band is planned to be allocated in a harmonized way across a large geographical 
area with high expected number of customers. There may also be economies of scale in service 
provision. 
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Notes 
 
                                                          
1 For example the international table and national allocations in the United States can be consulted in 
the following link https://transition.fcc.gov/oet/spectrum/table/fcctable.pdf 
 
2 As defined by the ITU in the article 1 of Radio Regulations 
 
3 Or even in the same country if the network provider does not cover all regions of the country 
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CHAPTER 2: PATH AND SPEED OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT REFORM 
UNDER ASSOCIATED UNCERTAIN COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
 
 
Abstract: The unsolved question in spectrum management is no longer if a reform is necessary to enable 
higher market participation but the optimal path and speed of reform with current and expected 
technological progress. This paper aims to contribute to answer this question offering a model to 
ascertain the optimal speed of reform and it sheds some light on the policy options available to reduce 
the uncertainty of the associated costs and benefits of reform. 
Key words: Radio-electric spectrum, efficiency, externalities, technological change. 
JEL Classification: O33, D61, D62. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the launching of the first service using radio spectrum in the late 19th century, wireless telegraphy, 
we have witnessed the emergence of innumerable new services competing for the access to a portion of 
the limited radio spectrum resources. Examples of services using the spectrum are radio, television, 
voice and video telephony, internet, national security and defense, whether forecasting, emergency 
assistance, guidance for navigation of all kinds of means of transport by air, ground and sea, the 
exploration of the cosmos and many others. Digital services, many of which use the spectrum, have an 
increasing impact in the economy. For example, they reduce information and coordination costs in the 
whole economy - activities became cheaper, faster and more convenient-, ease transactions and 
increase productivity, World Bank (2016). 
The allocation of spectrum to services has been planned by governmental agencies practically since the 
early days of radio communications. Governmental planning has been the response to the complex 
definition of property rights, high enforcement and transaction costs linked to the existence of harmful 
electromagnetic interferences, services that are pure public goods, externalities associated to services, 
and economies of scale when spectrum allocation is harmonized.  
In the last decades, improved technology enabling services to share the same portion of spectrum, a 
better understanding of interference solving and of spectrum markets and especially the extraordinary 
growth in the demand for spectrum, have put deep pressure to traditional allocation methods. As a 
result, the reform of spectrum has become a salient policy issue and multiple new approaches to 
spectrum management have emerged. Examples of spectrum management reforms are the use of 
auctions to grant licenses, the authorization of secondary market transactions -transfer, leasing, 
mutualisation of usage rights- , the use of administered incentive pricing, spectrum sharing techniques 
and the definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference parameters. 
 
Some remarkably anticipated very early, the need for more efficient approaches to spectrum 
management, Coase (1959, 1960), Levin (1970). Many more followed these claims supporting the 
exchange of usage rights in the market and market participation for a better allocation of radio 
spectrum, Hazlett (1998, 2003), Kwerel and Williams (2002), Baumol and Robyn (2006). Others proposed 
collective use of spectrum as an alternative solution to scarcity, Noam (1998), Benkler (2002), Werbach 
(2004). More recently, a number of authors pointed out the importance of incorporating the definition 
of acceptable interference in spectrum licenses to reduce transaction costs, Webb (2009), ITU (2009), 
Kwerel and Williams (2010) and Cave and Web (2012).  
 
Spectrum management reform should not be regarded solely as a conflict where we only have two 
options; either choosing governmental planning or market liberalization. An important component of 
inefficiency may account for the spectrum allocation process but yet a significant source stems from the 
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intrinsic nature of radio-spectrum. Spectrum physical features together with the attributes of services 
provided using the spectrum produce market failure. The response should be a combination of a sound 
regulatory framework, the internalization of technological progress in regulation to overcome market 
failure, and market participation in spectrum management in order to increase efficiency of spectrum 
allocation. 
  
Electromagnetic interference, a feature of spectrum usage, is a negative externality that makes the 
definition of property rights difficult, the respect for these rights hard to enforce and the cost of inter-
service and also intra-service spectrum transactions uncertain. Not only the costs but also the benefits 
of a spectrum management reform are uncertain due to, inter alia, of the existence of hard to measure 
external value linked to services.  García and Valiño (2013), Bazelon and McHenery (2013), Alden (2012), 
Prasad (2014) and Cave et al (2016) contributed to define methodologies for estimating the value of 
spectrum and the externalities linked to services. A more general framework to take account of 
externalities but yet highly applicable to the topic can be found in Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
The unsolved question in spectrum management is no longer if a reform enabling higher market 
participation is necessary or not but the path and speed of reform with current and expected technology 
evolution, and market and regulatory structure. This paper aims to contribute to answer this question by 
offering a model to ascertain the optimal speed of spectrum management reform.  We first study 
uncertainty sources to unravel causes and the potential policy responses since uncertainty of benefits 
and costs of reform is a key element of the porblem. We continue developing the analogy between the 
case of spectrum reform and the reform of economies in transition commenced by Minervini (2014). We 
depart from the model in Dewatripont and Roland (1995) adding the idiosyncrasies of spectrum 
management, namely the fast evolution of digital technologies using the spectrum, and the existence of 
market failure in the provision of wireless services. We also gained inside from the literature on 
investment under uncertain benefits e.g. Dixit (1992), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and the literature about 
uncertain costs of reform, Pindyck (1993). 
 
This paper is structured as follows section 2 analyzes the different types of reform and the available 
policy options, section 3 presents sources of uncertainty, section 4 offers a discussion on the optimal 
path and sequencing of spectrum management reform and section 5 concludes. 
2. Types of spectrum management reform 
 
We define a spectrum management reform as the regulatory change intended to enable increased 
efficiency of spectrum usage so that total welfare is maximized. Reforms can be categorized by the type 
of efficiency gain that they are intended to produce. Productive efficiency ensure that a service is 
provided with no more than the spectrum required, allocative efficiency that the assortment of services 
using the spectrum maximizes social welfare and dynamic efficiency that the compound of services can 
be changed when a new higher social welfare allocation emerges. 
 José Marino García García - Regulations and Strategies for the Digital Transformation                                                                     45 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Path and speed of spectrum management reform under uncertain costs and benefits 
 
 
Reforms take account of regulatory and technology innovation. An innovative regulatory change may 
consist of a new approach for defining property rights that reduces inter service transaction costs 
and/or the costs to enforce respect to spectrum usage rights, innovative ways to enable intra service 
transactions or the internalization of technology advance into spectrum usage rights. Specific policy 
recommendations exemplifying spectrum management reform types can be found in García-Zaballos 
and Foditsch (2015). 
We define two types of technological progress of spectrum usage.  A technology advancement 
improving the delivery of services happens when a new technology allows either using less amount of 
spectrum to provide a service, or it improves service features and capacity or both at the same time. For 
example, the second generation of mobile telephony allowed peak speed data rates of 9.6 kbps whereas 
fourth generation, the so called LTE, allows peak data rates of 1 Gbit/s. Another example is the 
migration from analogue to digital television. Digital television technologies can provide a minimum of 
four times more television channels than analogue using the same amount of spectrum. However, new 
technology such as this, does not improve the allocation of spectrum to services. 
A technology advancement improving the allocation of spectrum arises when a new technology enables 
for a better allocation of spectrum. Better allocations may be obtained from reducing inter service and 
intra service transaction costs, from allowing the usage of the same portion of spectrum by several 
services or from reducing the costs to enforce respect to spectrum usage rights. Carrying out spectrum 
inventories that identify spectrum supply and demand may help to figure out the expected return of a 
reform.  Next section identifies the different types of spectrum management reform and some policy 
options to implement them. 
2.1 Reforms achieving greater productive efficiency  
 
Productive efficiency of a given allocation of spectrum to services is achieved when a firm delivering a 
service cannot employ an additional unit of spectrum to increase production without reducing the 
production of another firm delivering the same service. When this condition is met the service is 
delivered at the lowest average total cost, and it uses the minimum possible amount of spectrum. In 
other words, the use of a portion of spectrum is productively efficient if service delivery is at the 
production possibility frontier. Figure 2.1 shows two firms A and B using a certain amount of spectrum 
to provide the same service. Points A, B are productively efficient, point C is inefficient and point D is not 
possible with current technology. The figure also depicts the effect of applying a new technology to the 
production of a service. A new technology improving productive efficiency would move right the 
productive possibility frontier curve. 
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Figure 2.7 Production possibility frontier of spectrum use with technology advancement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
Auctions of spectrum rights of use and the authorization of secondary market transactions are spectrum 
reforms intended to grant spectrum rights to those that value the spectrum the most and can deliver 
services using the minimum possible amount of spectrum. In figure 2.1, point C is not productively 
efficient. Auctions and secondary market transactions may move C closer to the production possibility 
frontier. 
One way of achieving higher productive efficiency of a new allocation of spectrum is to auction the 
rights of use. If licenses have already been granted, the authorization of secondary market transactions 
may help to improve the initial distribution of spectrum to firms. Examples of secondary market 
transactions are the possibility to transfer or leasing the spectrum rights of use to a different user 
providing the same service or the mutualisation of spectrum rights. Mutualisation consists of sharing all 
or part of the spectrum license among two or more firms providing the same service in the same or in 
different spectrum bands.  
As we can see in figure 2.1, the production possibility frontier curve shifts right if a new technology 
enables to use less spectrum or it improves service features. In this case, productive efficiency gains can 
be achieved immediately if spectrum licenses allow spectrum users to change technology without prior 
administrative authorization. For efficiency gains to be obtained technology change must not cause 
harmful interference to spectrum users in the same or adjacent bands. An example of an authorization 
of technology change is the so called spectrum re-farming authorizing the migration of spectrum use to 
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more advanced generation of mobile technologies. If technology change is not allowed and there is 
technological change, points A and B in figure 2.1 that before the new technology were efficient would 
be situated below the new production possibility frontier.  
 
2.2 Reforms achieving greater allocative efficiency  
 
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the distribution of services into spectrum portions is optimal so 
that social welfare is maximized. Optimality includes not only the private value of spectrum, - the 
willingness to pay of the firm using the spectrum -, but also its social value -externalities linked to the 
delivery of services-. Allocative efficiency is achieved when the marginal benefit of spectrum use equals 
the marginal cost of service delivery for all applications using the spectrum. 
 
Achievement of productive efficiency does not preclude the attainment of allocative efficiency. Let’s 
consider a service A using the spectrum with lower value for society than service B. Service A enjoys the 
allocation of a higher amount of spectrum than B. The introduction of a productively efficient reform in 
both, A and B, may increase total welfare less than changing the allocation of spectrum in order to grant 
more spectrum to the service A with higher social value. Table 2.1 shows a spectrum reform increasing 
productive efficiency in A and B. Table 2.2 represents a reform changing the allocation of spectrum to 
increase social welfare. As it can be observed total welfare is higher in reform 2 than in reform 1. It is 
important to note that for the calculations in table 2.2 we have considered diminishing returns to the 
amount of spectrum allocated to a service. This is because social value per unit of spectrum allocated to 
a service decreases when the amount of spectrum allocated to this service increases. 
 
Table 2.1: Productive efficiency reform 
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated 
Social value per 
unit of spectrum 
Productive 
efficiency 
(Before reform) 
Productive 
efficiency 
(After reform) 
Total Welfare 
A 10 1 75% 90% 9 
B 2 5 75% 90% 9 
A+B 12 1.664 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 90% (Avg) 18 
Source: Authors 
Table 2.2: Change of allocation reform 
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated 
Social value per 
unit of spectrum 
Productive 
efficiency 
Total Welfare 
A 6 2 75% 9 
B 6 4 75% 18 
A+B 12 3 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 27 
Source: Authors 
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Examples of reforms increasing allocative efficiency are the use of administered incentive pricing, 
incentive auctions and spectrum sharing licenses. Administered incentive pricing
1 (AIP) consists of charging a fee for the use of spectrum which is related to the opportunity cost of using 
this portion of spectrum, Smith-Nera (1996) and Cave, Doyle and Webb (2007). Different portions have 
distinct values, so using AIP requires calculating the opportunity cost of using each frequency band. The 
purpose of AIP is making license owners to return the spectrum if they are using a band inefficiently. The 
fee should take account of the costs borne by another services not using the band. Costs may come 
from using the service with means different to spectrum, or with a less valuable spectrum band. AIP can 
be a good measure to increase allocative efficiency when it is possible to calculate spectrum value, both 
private and social. However, a state agency may lack the monetary measure of costs and profits of 
spectrum use because it does not have all the relevant information regarding consumer preferences and 
spectrum users’ willingness to pay. 
 
Incentive auctions2 consists of two related auctions, a forward auction where it is determined a firm’s 
willingness to pay to access the spectrum and a reverse auction which establish the price for which the 
firm using the spectrum is willing to sell it. Prior to the auction, it is necessary to design a frequency 
repacking process analyzing the potential transaction costs of spectrum reallocation in order to reduce 
the uncertainty of the process. Incentive auctions enable the change of use of spectrum, thus increasing 
not only allocative efficiency but also productive efficiency. The allocation change is valued by the 
market instead of administratively determined, so reducing the possibility to cross-subsidize one of the 
services involved in the transaction. An example of an incentive auction design can be found in FCC 
(2012). 
 
The term spectrum sharing encompasses a set of different spectrum management concepts. It may refer 
to the collective use of spectrum, the dynamic spectrum management, or the underlay spectrum 
management. Definitions can be found in RSPG (2011). The collective use of spectrum is the use of 
spectrum without license under a set of well-defined set of technical conditions. Spectrum user can 
access the spectrum provided that they use devices in compliance with the conditions previously 
defined. Collective use does not increase allocative efficiency since it can be used neither to migrate to a 
more efficient allocation of spectrum nor to allow the delivery of several services in the same portion of 
spectrum. Collective use is a way of delivering services that doesn’t require the grant of rights of use. It 
is normally employed for allocating spectrum to short-range devices such as Wi-Fi or RFID applications.  
 
Spectrum underlay also known as spread spectrum technologies consist of the emission of very low 
spectral power density signals that can coexist with other spectrum uses in the same frequency, with 
the effect of slightly increasing the noise floor -electromagnetic interference- to incumbent spectrum 
users. Spectrum underlay is a way to increase allocative efficiency in spectrum management since it 
allows the use of the same portion of spectrum by different services and it also enables future changes 
of use. 
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Dynamic spectrum management includes both, regulatory instruments and technical approaches. It is 
intended to allow using a portion of spectrum by an entrant and an incumbent spectrum user taking 
advantage of the fact that the incumbent is not using a frequency in a particular geographical area or 
time slot. Examples of technical approaches are cognitive radio, sensing of frequencies being used, geo-
location beacons or databases of spectrum usage. A regulatory instrument enabling dynamic use of 
spectrum is the definition of shared access licenses. Such licenses delimit usage conditions of a 
particular portion of spectrum being used by an incumbent for a defined time period or area. Table 2.3 
shows total welfare after introducing both a new allocation and a spectrum sharing reform.  
 
Table 2.3: Spectrum sharing reform 
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated 
Social value per 
unit of spectrum 
Productive 
efficiency 
Total Welfare 
A 6 2 75% 9 
B 6 4 75% 18 
C 2 2 75% 3 
A+B+C 12 3 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 30 
Source: Authors 
 
2.3 Reforms achieving greater dynamic efficiency  
 
Dynamic efficiency is achieved when it is possible to change the allocation of spectrum in response to 
either the emergence of new services with high social value or when there is a change in the value 
generated by services that turns inefficient current allocation. For example, the increasing number of 
applications offered through mobile broadband increase the social value of this service over time. 
 
Spectrum reforms intended to increase dynamic efficiency also increment allocative efficiency. The 
significant difference between reforms increasing allocative efficiency and reforms enhancing both is 
that the latter can be used not only in a particular case but also in future changes of allocation. The line 
delimitating whether a reform increases only allocative or also dynamic efficiency is sometimes blurred. 
For example, the design and processes of an incentive auction may be re-used in the future if the service 
demanding to access the spectrum share technical features with the services for which the incentive 
auction was designed, but in other situations the incentive auction should be redesigned. 
 
Examples of reforms dynamically efficient are those enabling future changes of spectrum allocations. 
Two examples are the authorization of spectrum underlay technologies, and the definition of licenses in 
terms of acceptable interference. Spectrum underlay technologies are able to use the spectrum that is 
already in use by other service without interfering with the incumbent user. Future changes of the 
underlay spectrum use are possible. 
 
The definition of spectrum licenses in terms of the maximum acceptable interference, that devices are 
willing to accept, facilitates inter-service spectrum transactions, thus the dynamic allocation of spectrum 
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without administrative intervention. Let’s define an interference limit that the devices using a frequency 
band are willing to accept, for example -110 dBm per MHz3.  Transaction costs of a change of spectrum 
allocation would be greatly reduced if an entrant service is able to comply with this limit and it is willing 
to pay for the access to the portion of the spectrum for which limits of acceptable interference has been 
defined. The lowered transaction costs stems from the reduced risk of interference. Even if a frequency 
repackaging process is necessary in the reallocation process, uncertainty and transaction cost will have 
been greatly reduced. An increasing number of authors have claimed for the importance of 
incorporating the definition of acceptable interference in spectrum licenses, Webb (2009), Kwerel and 
Williams (2010) and Cave and Web (2012). 
 
2.4 Mixed reforms 
 
Spectrum reforms rarely have economic sense implemented individually. Reforms usually come in 
packages that need to be carried out sequentially. Table 2.4 shows total welfare of a productively 
efficient reform followed by a reform improving allocative efficiency. The initial allocation is described in 
table 2.1. 
 Table 2.4: Mixed reform 
Service Units of 
spectrum 
allocated after 
reform 
Social value 
per unit of 
spectrum 
Productive 
efficiency 
(Before reform) 
Productive 
efficiency 
(After reform) 
Total Welfare 
A 6 2 75% 90% 10.8 
B 6 4 75% 90% 21.6 
A+B 12 3 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 90% (Avg) 32.4 
Source: Authors 
Normally it is not possible to make a choice on the order of spectrum reforms. However, it is possible to 
choose the starting time and speed of the first and subsequent changes. To exemplify how a mixed 
reform is carried out, let’s consider technology advancement allowing the provision of a service using 
less amount of spectrum. The result of reform implementation is a new portion of available spectrum 
that can be used either to increase the amount produced of the existing service or to allocate a new 
service with expected higher social value. If the latter option is carried out then a second reform is 
required to accommodate the entrant service to the available spectrum.  
A real example of such situation is the transition from analogue to digital television in the UHF band, the 
so called digital dividend. Transition resulted in the availability of new frequencies in a band highly 
demanded. After the transition part of the frequencies of the digital dividend were allocated to mobile 
broadband. The new allocation required a series of complex technical studies in order to reduce 
interference problems between mobile broadband and digital television services. 
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3. Uncertainty associated to spectrum management reform 
 
Spectrum management reforms intended to increase productive efficiency are usually less prone to 
uncertain results. Consequently, once regulatory mechanisms are created, transactions can be carried 
out by market agents provided that there is sufficient supervision on effective competition4. Examples 
are transfers, leases, or mutualisation of spectrum rights among firms providing the same service. 
The incorporation of technology change in licenses, the so-called frequency re-farming, enables market 
agents to efficiently carry out inter-band technology change since interference problems that may arise 
would be solved as described in the Coase theorem. The theorem conditions, well defined property 
rights and low transaction costs are usually met in spectrum re-farming type of transactions. However, 
market agent behavior might not always be efficient. If the adoption of a new technology results in 
increased competition, market agents might not have the incentive to embrace it in order to keep the 
privileges of reduced competition. In such cases, a regulatory action would be required. Lack of 
incentives to adopt new technology may explain why in most countries radio FM services are still being 
provided using analogue technologies while much more efficient digital technologies are available5.  
Reforms intended to change the allocation of spectrum and mixed reforms where an allocation change 
is included are usually expected to produce the highest benefit if carried out in the right moment. 
However, such reforms have not only uncertain returns, especially uncertain external benefit fulfillment, 
but also uncertain costs. Lack of information about the cost of reforms is an important reason for the 
market to refrain to carry out transactions. Regulatory mechanisms such as the design of incentive 
auctions or the definition of licenses in terms of maximum acceptable interference might help market 
agents to increase efficiency of changes of spectrum allocation. The following sections analyze 
uncertainty of spectrum management reform both in the return and the cost of reform. 
3.1 Uncertain return of a spectrum management reform 
 
The return of a spectrum management reform is uncertain because of the existence of externalities, 
services that are pure public goods and economies of scale when the use of spectrum is harmonized. 
The following sections analyze each of the causes of uncertainty. 
3.1.1 Externalities 
 
The analysis of the social efficiency of a spectrum reform should include the reform effects on economic 
growth, equal opportunities for marginal groups in society and the promotion of effective competition; 
see Cave (2002), ITU (2009). 
Positive externalities appear as a result of the increased number of possibilities for producing goods and 
services, easier access to information, reduced transaction costs and new chances for consuming new 
products and services. If these externalities are not included in spectrum management decisions some 
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services would be provided at a below-the-optimum amount. For example broadband, a service that can 
be provided using the spectrum, has been associated to GDP growth and productivity increase, Gillet et 
al (2006), Litan and Rivlin (2001), Goss (2001), López Sánchez et al (2004, 2006). 
Production below the optimum may happen for a variety of reasons. One is the economies of density 
associated to network deployment. Rural areas coverage may be socially desirable but privately 
unprofitable. Urban-rural cross subsidy or public funding are socially efficient in these cases to achieve 
the optimal social production. Another one is sunk costs6, subsidies and/or public private partnerships 
may help mitigate the problem. 
The expected value of a reform may be biased by miscalculating the external value. The social value of 
spectrum includes what spectrum users are willing to pay plus the externalities associated with the 
services using the spectrum. Whereas making an educated guess about the private value may be 
possible, the value of the spillover effects is much more uncertain and difficult to assess.  
Private value may be calculated with some precision by carefully studying the result of previous 
auctions, applying the cash flow method7, measuring the difference in the total cost of ownership of 
deploying a network without a spectrum band, Frias et al (2016),  or even using production functions see 
R. Prasad (2014). Sometimes, the calculation of the external value may not be necessary if the loss of 
spectrum resulting from a reform can be compensated by non-spectrum inputs, e.g. a higher number of 
radio stations, see J.M. Garcia and A. Valiño (2013), M. Cave (2016). In this case, the calculation of 
externalities may be substituted by the calculation of the cost of providing the service by other means. 
In other cases, such substitution is either technically unfeasible or financially impossible since the cost of 
alternative inputs is unbearable. Then, there is no alternative to calculating the cost of externality loss in 
order to assess the expected return of the reform. 
  3.1.2 Pure public goods 
Some spectrum services provide goods non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Examples are national security 
and defense, emergency assistance, scientific research, whether forecasting or climate change 
monitoring. These services are not delivered by the market and are usually financed with public budget 
for everyone’s benefit. How much spectrum has to be allocated to those services is uncertain since the 
calculation of the benefits they produce is complex. 
Spectrum management reform based on the increased use of spectrum sharing has been proposed in 
the US and Europe as a means to increase efficiency, especially in bands currently used to provide pure 
public goods. However, there must be mechanisms to maintain the optimal production of these public 
goods ensuring both an optimal amount of spectrum and a service provision free from harmful 
interference.  
For example, a US Government Report, PCAST (2012) found that clearing and reallocation of Federal 
spectrum8 -the spectrum used to deliver pure public goods- would be expensive and lengthy and 
reallocation a not sustainable basis for spectrum policy. Instead, it is proposed to use spectrum sharing 
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as a means to increase efficiency under a licensed regime. In Europe, a Communication from the 
European Commission to the Parliament, EC (2012) defined the conditions to promote the shared use of 
spectrum. 
The definition of clear and effective sharing rules may help to formulate better defined property rights 
and reduced transaction costs, thus satisfying Coasian schemes. However, the expected result of the 
Coase theorem, the achievement of an optimal agreement mutually advantageous between spectrum 
users, may work only for spectrum sharing between commercial uses. In the case of social production, 
even if public goods have higher social value, the public service provider will not be able to pay for 
interference solution when it happens. Thus, when the spectrum is shared between services producing 
pure public goods and commercial goods there must be mechanisms to enforce property rights and 
avoiding harmful interference. 
3.1.3 Economies of scale 
 
The allocation of the same portion of spectrum in a broad geographical area, known as spectrum 
harmonization, produces important economies of scale which reduces the cost of manufacturing 
transmitting and receiving devices.  Savings stem from the distribution among a larger number of users 
of the cost of designing the electronics needed for using a frequency band. It also arises from the 
diminished technical complexity of the device resulting from the reduced amount of frequencies it has 
to operate with. The latter effect is especially important in services that are supplied using several 
frequency bands such as mobile telephony. 
For some services, there are additional benefits of harmonization. For example, the allocation of the 
same spectrum band to mobile networks in several countries enables to continue using the same mobile 
terminal in different countries via “roaming”9 agreements. In such case, not only devices cost less but 
also service utility is enhanced. Harmonization of a portion of spectrum may lead to the harmonization 
of the adjacent portions. The use of an adjacent spectrum band may exponentially reduce the cost of 
deployment of a new network because it enables re-using infrastructure of existing sites10 and it creates 
economies of scale in network deployment. 
Regulators and market agents involved should act concertedly to make harmonization of certain bands 
possible in order to achieve the benefits of the economies of scale. Worldwide harmonization is 
desirable in certain occasions. The calculation of the return of a spectrum management reform is 
uncertain since it may depend on the agent coordination success. 
3.2 Uncertain cost of spectrum management reform 
 
Changes in the allocation of spectrum may create harmful interference, fragmentation and costs 
associated to the reallocation of existing services. A high level of spectrum exploitation is associated 
with higher adaptation costs of existing devices, higher cost for reallocating spectrum, and 
compensations to spectrum users with licenses still in force. 
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3.2.1 Uncertain interference levels 
 
Changes in allocation of spectrum may create harmful interference to existing services stemming from 
the different emission parameters, density of stations and typical power of the new services. 
 
3.2.1.1 Different emission parameters 
 
The relevant parameters involved in the characterization of harmful interference11 are the design of 
transmitters and receivers12 and the emission parameters and techniques13. Main emission parameters 
are frequency, power, location and direction. The emission techniques depend on technology14. These 
techniques are normally intended to increase coverage or service capacity but may also have an impact 
on the existence of or shielding to harmful interference. Transmitters are designed to produce a certain 
limited amount of out of band emission15 without interfering neighboring spectrum users and receivers 
are able to accept certain amount and still performing well. Consequently, the existence of harmful 
interference depends on how sensitive to harmful interference are the devices of the incumbent 
services to the emissions of the entrant and vice versa. 
Compatibility between stations providing a service and frequency adjacent services is achieved through 
the setup of limits on emission parameters that are set forth in the spectrum license by a Governmental 
agency. Devices and emission techniques are designed to on the one hand maximize capacity and on the 
other hand to avoid harmful interference among radio stations of the same and adjacent services. If 
there is a change in spectrum allocation, the existing emission parameters and /or devices may interfere 
with or be interfered by new devices using the adjacent band since they were not initially designed to 
deal with the new sources of interference. The cost to cope with interference is uncertain not only from 
the point of view of the engineering process, complex compatibility studies are required, but also from 
the point of view of the coordination of all involved agents. 
A spectrum allocation approach with reduced interference problems is the use of underlay spectrum 
sharing techniques. Under such approach, new devices are able to co-exists with incumbent users in the 
same frequency band under a set of well-defined conditions, but this kind of solutions are limited to low 
power applications. Dynamic sharing is an additional approach that may be used when incumbent 
services are not using the spectrum in a particular geographical area or time slot. 
A more global solution is the reform of spectrum licenses in order to include the maximum interference 
that devices should be able to tolerate instead of defining their emission parameters. Doing so, would 
enable future changes in the allocation of spectrum that would be much less complex and uncertain. 
3.2.1.2 Density of stations, the cumulative effect 
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The greater the density of radio-stations in an area the higher it will be the probability of harmful 
interference due to the accumulation of interfering signals of multiple nearby stations. Webb (2009) 
maintains that when there is a change in spectrum allocation the cumulative interference effect may 
have a higher impact on the entrants than on the incumbent service. Networks using the initial 
allocation of spectrum are usually deployed in parallel, thus, the density of stations is similar and the 
cumulative interference problems are solved dynamically during network deployment. However, when 
there is a new allocation of spectrum, the network of the entrant service is not yet deployed and it is 
more exposed to the potential cumulative inference of a much denser network in an adjacent band. The 
cumulative effect increases the interference problems suffered by the entrants. 
A well-designed spectrum license should incorporate a set of parameters including not only the 
maximum acceptable interference from a station but also taking account of the cumulative effect. Such 
parameter definition complicates license design but diminish future transaction costs. 
3.2.1.3 Differences in the typical power of stations 
 
Problems such as coverage holes16 or receiver’s blocking17 may appear if there is a significant difference 
between the typical power of stations of the incumbent service and the stations of a new spectrum 
allocation. When the typical power of stations is similar, the location of both the entrant and the 
incumbent services’ stations tend to be similar and such problems are much less important. 
A solution to the problem may be to create different frequency bands bearing in mind the typical power 
of stations providing the service. These frequency bands would be separated by guard bands to mitigate 
potential interferences among services. Within these bands, changes in the allocation of spectrum to 
services with similar features would be much easy to be carried out. A potential optimal organization of 
such frequency groups would be the creation of bands for unidirectional high power networks -
broadcasting-; for unidirectional low power- mobile multimedia-; and low power bidirectional networks-
mobile broadband. 
3.2.2 Fragmentation of spectrum allocation 
 
Reallocation of spectrum might create gaps and fragmentation of spectrum use. The minimum number 
of spectrum units used by each service is usually different. Consequently, reallocation may result in 
unused portions of spectrum. For example, let’s consider service A using multiples of eight units of 
spectrum to provide a service and service B using multiples of five. If service A is willing to relinquish 
eight units in exchange for compensation and service B is willing to pay the compensation, three units 
would be left unused until a new service is willing and it is able to use them. If service B would require 
10 units, then the result is either the impossibility to make the transaction or the creation of a band of 
six units of unused spectrum, provided that B is willing to relinquish 16 units.  
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Furthermore, the provision of services on adjacent frequency bands usually requires the creation of a 
guard band18 whose size may be one or several units of spectrum in order to avoid harmful interference 
among services.  
3.2.3 Uncertain costs associated to the existing licenses and devices  
 
A higher level of usage of a frequency band by incumbents is associated with higher adaptation costs of 
existing devices, higher cost for reallocating the spectrum, and compensations to spectrum users with 
licenses still in force when there is a reallocation process. 
3.2.3.1 Compensation costs 
 
Reforms changing spectrum allocation may pose important compensation costs. In some cases licenses 
have not expired and current licensees have the right to receive compensation for loss of earnings 
before a spectrum band is made available to a new service. When licenses have different expiration 
periods it may be more difficult to make the frequencies available, Minervini and Piacentino (2007).  
3.2.3.2 Reallocation costs during the transition period 
 
Reforms making available a portion of spectrum tor a new service involve financial costs beyond the 
compensations for loss of earnings. Such reforms require adaptations like changing the transmission 
frequency, or adapting receivers so that they are no longer able to receive the frequencies allocated to 
the new entrant service. Receiver adaptation can be done by placing filters at the input of the receiver. 
Additionally, in some cases it may be necessary to simulcast19 new and old frequencies during a period 
which imply higher network operation costs for the incumbent during the transition period.  
 3.2.3.3 Adaptation of existing devices 
 
The sensitivity to the adjacent channel interference is an important parameter of a receiver. The more 
resilient it is the device the more expensive it becomes the electronics used to mitigate interference. 
Manufacturers design devices to work in a certain predefined environment. If a new allocation is made 
in an adjacent band, receiver features may not be sufficient to avoid harmful interference produced by 
the entrant services. There exist mitigation techniques such as placing filters at the input of the receiver 
to solve the problem. However, the total cost of the adaptation is uncertain because depends on the 
features of the stock of receivers, which usually is an unknown variable. Once again, the definition of 
licenses in terms of acceptable interference would help to manufacture more resilient devices, 
consequently, lowering transaction costs of changes of spectrum allocation. 
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4. A model to analyze the path and speed of spectrum management reform 
 
We bring the literature of political economy of reform to the topic of spectrum management. We 
continue developing the analogies between the case of spectrum reform and the reform of economies 
in transition commenced by Minervini (2014). We depart from the model in Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995) adding the idiosyncrasies of spectrum management. First, we include the evolution of technology 
as an endogenous variable and then we allow for different discount factors for each reform depending 
on technology evolution. We have changed some of the notations, explained the meaning of some 
variables from the view of spectrum reform and restricted the value that some parameters can take but 
assumptions and definitions remain similar to those used in Dewatripont and Roland (1995). 
The most significant difference between the reform of spectrum management and of economies in 
transition is the pace of technological progress. Whereas in the latter technology is ‘sticky’ and it doesn´t 
change much during the timeframe of reform implementation, in spectrum reform it may change during 
the analyzed timeframe. Technology is a salient factor to determine the strategy of a spectrum reform. 
It determines whether to implement gradual or big bang type of reforms. Consequently, in our model 
technology is an endogenous explanatory variable. Furthermore, the realization of states of nature, the 
exogenous variables, changes when reforms are carried out with new technology since technology acts 
as a multiplier of some states of nature.  
A spectrum management reform is a set of regulatory changes intended to increase productive, 
allocative or dynamic efficiency. In most cases, the order of reform implementation cannot be chosen 
but reformers can decide when to start and the speed. The starting moment is important because not 
only costs but also the benefits of reform depend on the technology used when the reform is carried 
out. 
Big bang reform packages are those introducing reforms quickly and simultaneously. Gradual reform 
packages are those implemented in such a way that it can be decided whether to proceed with the next 
package or postpone it. One reason to postpone a reform is waiting for the arrival of a new expected 
technology. 
Reforms are regulatory changes intended to enable increasing efficiency either productive or allocative 
or dynamic. Examples were described in section 2. Reforms are carried out sequentially if they are 
complementary. Although we simplify the model considering only two sequential reforms we do not loss 
generality since it can be understood as complementary packages of reforms that can be carried out in 
two sequential moments. 
Reform packages can be designed to increase any of the types of efficiency. There may be two 
productively efficient reforms in different portions of spectrum or geographical locations. For example, 
the use of auctions in a portion of the spectrum followed by the use of auctions in the rest of portions 
being used by this service. It can also be mixed reforms packages where it is necessary first a 
productively efficient reform and then a subsequent reform improving allocative efficiency. An example 
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is the introduction of a new technology that free up spectrum that can be used by an entrant. Finally the 
definition of spectrum licenses in terms of the maximum acceptable interference may be carried out for 
a spectrum band and hereinafter in other bands. 
The outcome generated by a reform depends on a set of possible states of nature with    elements. 
These elements include the uncertain factors described in section 3.2, interference levels, fragmentation 
of spectrum, costs associated to the existing licenses and devices and also when applicable what was 
described in section 3.1, economies of scale, externalities and pure public goods. Other aspects such as 
political constraints, investment behavior are also included in the composition of the states of nature 
but for those, technology is not a multiplier. 
We consider an infinite time horizon. Reforms are carried out with a discount factor    . There are 
two reforms       to be carried out in the period analyzed. The outcome of reform   depends on the 
realizations of the states of nature. The realization of the   th element of a reform is 
      {                }. Therefore, the realization of the   th element of reform 1 is       and the 
realization of the   th element of reform 2 is     . The corresponding outcome for these realizations is 
                           We consider reform outcome to be time invariant. The present value of 
           at the moment when the first reform is realized is denoted by 
                          ⁄    Technological advancement is denoted by    . 
The outcome of a reform is unknown before it is implemented, for this reason we work with ex ante 
expected results. We denote expected outcomes depending on the strategy of reform, big bang or 
gradual, and the knowledge about the payoff of the first reform once it is realized.               
    is the expected outcome of a big bang reform before any of them have been realized. 
                is the expected outcome of a big bang strategy given that the first reform has 
already been conducted.              is the expected outcome of a gradual type reform once the 
first has been realized.       because of the required complementarity of reforms. However, in 
gradual reforms, from the implementation of     one can learn about the final total payoff of reform 
and postpone second reform, whereas in big bang reforms both reforms have already been 
compromised and reformers cannot back out. A realization of the state of nature of the first reform   is 
higher than realization   ̃  if  
   ̃                        ̃          
 
There is a probability that the reform has lower payoff than expected. We denote this situation as 
  (    ̃ )    ̅̅ ̅. We denote the opposite situation as   (    ̃ )     .  
Another important aspect of the model is the degree of reversibility of reforms. If the outcome of a 
reform is lower than the expected initially reform may not be finished. Therefore reversibility doesn´t 
mean to completely go back the reform but part of the investment associated to the reform can be 
maintained on hold. An example would be to stop the deployment of the network of an entrant service 
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allocation when the most profitable regions are covered leaving less profitable areas uncovered because 
the reform is more expensive than expected due to the emergence of interference problems. We 
denote the degree of reversibility of a big bang reform     .In the case of the gradual approach the 
reversibility of the first and second reforms are defined respectively      and      . 
              
 
The payoff of a big bang reform can be written as follows 
 
           ̅̅ ̅̅    ̅̅ ̅     
Where 
      |    ̃                   
 
    
      |    ̃     ̅̅ ̅                 
 
  is the payoff of the big bang reform conditional to a payoff of the first reform higher than expected, 
  ̅̅ ̅ is the payoff of the big bang reform conditional to a payoff of the first reform lower than expected. 
The payoff of a gradual reform is 
                 ̅̅ ̅̅               
 
Proposition 1:  The condition for gradualism to dominate big band strategies under technological 
advance is 
  
       [     ]
   ̅̅ ̅̅  [    ]
 
Proof see appendix 
Let’s consider now two different discount factors for reform 1 and reform 2 denoted by       and an 
expected technological advancement after reform 2. We denote    the additional discount factor to be 
added to   if it is decided to undertake a gradual type of reform with the goal of waiting until the new 
technology is available. The relationship between the discount factors is: 
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Under such conditions the big bang reform expression can be expressed: 
     [         ]     ̅̅ ̅̅ [        ]     
 
The expression for the gradual reform is  
              ̅̅ ̅̅      [        
   ]            
 
Proposition 2: If there is a technological advancement that may enable the achievement of higher 
expected outcome, a gradual reform waiting to incorporate the new technology is a better strategy than 
a big bang reform if the additional discount factor introduced by the awaiting time fulfills the following 
expression 
   
  [          ]           [    ]
     
 
Provided that  
                    [    ]
  
   
 
Proof see appendix 
5. Conclusions 
 
Spectrum management reform can be analyzed from the perspective of the political economy of reform 
adding the idiosyncrasies of high technology industries. Such industries are characterized among other 
factors by intense technological eveolution. Another distinctive feature is the impossibility of completely 
reverse reforms. Reversibility here does not mean to return to the status quo but to leave unfinished 
some reform components. For example, the result of an unfinished reform may be network deployment 
solely in profitable areas, enabling the benefits only in high densely populated areas, or in other cases, 
the expected number of transactions may not be achieved, being reduced to the cases where 
uncertainty is the lowest. An Additional characteristic is that the reformers of spectrum management 
cannot usually choose the order of reforms. The reason is that reforms must not only be complementary 
but also have to be carried out in a particular order. An example of a forced sequence of reforms is the 
adoption of a new technology, followed by a new spectrum allocation and a subsequent reallocation of 
the newly freed up spectrum to the incumbent and to an entrant user. This reform package must follow 
a particular order. The reformer instead must choose the right moment to start the reform and the 
implementation strategy, either big bang or gradual.  
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We offer an expression to determine when to choose a gradual or big bang reform depending on 
current technology and an expression to determine whether to wait or not for a new technological 
advancement. The results depend on the expected outcome of the reform, the probability of realization 
of the states of nature and the cost of reform reversal.  
We have also shed some light on the types of spectrum management reform by categorizing them in 
terms of the type of efficiency gain that the reform is intended to produce,- productive, allocative and 
dynamic-. Furthermore, we have analyzed market failures responsible for uncertain outcomes to help 
tackling the underlying causes of failure.  
The use of market mechanisms to improve productive efficiency, -intra-band technological change, 
auctions and secondary market transactions-, has already been fruitful on the portions of spectrum 
traditionally been used for commercial purposes. In such cases, market forces may result in productively 
efficient transactions provided that Coasian schemes are fulfilled; low transaction costs and well-defined 
property rights.  
Transactions enabling allocative and dynamic efficiency are not yet possible to be produced solely by 
market forces. New approaches such as the design of incentive auctions give a broader role to market 
participants but the active contribution of the regulatory authority to design the direct and reverse 
auction and the repackaging process is still necessary. A different instrument, the authorization of new 
technologies enabling to share spectrum previously used by an incumbent service, is improving 
allocative efficiency making market agents more involved in spectrum allocation. However, sharing 
techniques are usually limited either to short range devices, the case of underlay spectrum techniques, 
or by the availability of unused spectrum in certain areas or time slots, the case of dynamic spectrum 
sharing. Spectrum sharing techniques that are useful to improve the efficiency of spectrum allocation 
cannot be used as means to enable the change of use of a band solely by market forces. 
An additional innovative approach to spectrum management is the definition of spectrum licenses in 
terms of the maximum acceptable interference that devices should be able to accept. This technique 
may pose a significant advancement to achieve the goal of enabling market transactions changing the 
allocation of spectrum. However, better knowledge of interference problems and more importantly the 
design of new types of licenses, would be required to move forward. 
The efficiency of changes of spectrum allocation by market forces may be hampered by the existence of 
externalities associated to services and services that are pure public goods. In addition, market agents 
may not be willing to change to a more socially efficient spectrum allocation due to several reasons 
including the existence of uncertain costs but also because  current market structure may grant market 
power to incumbent users, a situation that they  are interested to preserve. Regulators must analyze the 
possibility to enable the re-allocation of spectrum by market forces on a case by case basis. 
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Annex 1: Proof of propositions 
 
Proposition 1 
According to (3) and (6), for a gradual to be superior to a big bang reform, the following must be fulfilled 
              ̅̅ ̅̅             [            ]     ̅̅ ̅̅ [          ] 
              ̅̅ ̅̅      [            ]     ̅̅ ̅̅      
    ̅̅̅[    ]      [               ] 
  
       [     ]
   ̅̅ ̅̅  [    ]
 
We know that       and        and   1 therefore all the terms of the expression are positive 
 
Proposition2 
According to (9) and (10), for a gradual to be superior to a big bang reform, the following must be 
fulfilled 
 
           ̅̅ ̅̅      [        
   ]    [         ]     ̅̅ ̅̅ [        ]       
     
        ̅̅ ̅̅                                     
    [           ]      ̅̅ ̅̅                                     
 
   
  [          ]           [    ]
     
 
For this expression to be positive it must be fulfilled the following condition 
  [          ]           [    ]    
         [    ]    [          ] 
 
                    [    ]
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Notes 
 
                                                          
1 AIP have been implemented in the UK and Canada. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-and-
statements/category-1/aip/update201008 
 
2 More information about the process of an incentive auction can be found at: 
https://www.fcc.gov/wireless/auction-1000 
 
3 Normally there will be a different limit for each type of device, for example, one for transmitters and a 
different one for receivers. 
 
4 In some cases the establishment of ex-ante regulation such as the definition of spectrum caps might be 
required to achieve effective competition. Spectrum caps are limits to the maximum amount of 
spectrum that a firm is allowed to use to provide a service. In other occasions ex-post measures might 
be enough. 
 
5 A complementary explanation is that digital radio receivers are still expensive, and the use of analogue 
devices is highly extended. 
 
6 Examples of infrastructure involved in high sunk costs are the deployment of satellite networks or 
undersea cables. 
 
7 Profit generated on account of the allocated spectrum. 
 
8A list of Federal Spectrum uses elaborated by NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration) can be found at 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/spectrum_use_summary_master-07142014.pdf 
 
9 Roaming is the possibility to continue receiving a service when travelling abroad. Roaming can be 
enjoyed either because a frequency band is harmonized or because user´s terminal can operate in the 
different frequency bands used in each country. 
 
10 This includes reusing infrastructure like telecommunication towers, the electric feeding system, 
communication devices and also rights of way and site leasing. 
 
11 There are three types of interference: geographical, out of band and in the band itself. Licenses would 
establish the maximum interference from the adjacent channel and the maximum out of band 
interference (Cave and Webb, 2003). 
 
12 The same radio communication device can work as a transmitter and receiver. For example, a mobile 
terminal is able to transmit and receive. 
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13 Unwanted energy can also be the result of a combination of emissions, e.g. intermodulation products, 
or inductions upon reception. 
 
14 For example the use of transmission power control techniques intended to increase mobile phones 
battery life increases the probability of harmful interference to other systems  
http://www.erodocdb.dk/docs/doc98/official/pdf/ECCRep138.pdf 
15 Transmission devices send part of the power emitted outside their transmission band. The amount of 
power sent out of band depends on the features of the transmitter´s output filter. Furthermore, due to 
the existence of intermodulation products, interferences can be produced on frequencies different to 
those emitted, due to the emission of a mixture of frequencies taking place in the transmitter. There 
also exists interference caused by the accumulation of out-of-band signals from multiple nearby 
transmitters. 
 
16 When the transmitter of a new service is located at the coverage edge of the existing services the 
probability of interference increases. Services with similar typical power tend to share the same or 
nearby sites thus, reducing the possibility of coverage holes. 
 
17 A receiver can be blocked in the presence of a nearby high power signal. Under such condition the 
receiver is unable to receive any signal. 
 
18 The existence of guard bands may be necessary even to expand the allocation of a service to adjacent 
bands. For example, the expansion of mobile broadband to adjacent frequency bands requires creating 
a guard band of unused spectrum. 
 
19 For example, freeing up the so called digital dividend frequencies required to simulcast new and old 
television channels during a period of time to let people adapt building reception facilities. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRICE DISCRIMINATION OF OTT PROVIDERS UNDER 
DUOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND MULTI-DIMESIONAL PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION IN RETAIL BROADBAND ACCESS 
 
  
 
 
Abstract: Network neutrality regulation prevents access providers to price discriminate between content providers 
and product differentiation in terms of connection quality in the retail broadband access market. This paper 
analyzes the economic implications of price discrimination under duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional 
product differentiation in retail internet access using a sequential-moves game theoretic model. Under this 
framework, we discuss the impact of product differentiation and price discrimination on social welfare, and offer 
systematic simulations using feasible ranges for parameters value to help discern the impact of departing from 
network neutrality regulation on social welfare. 
Keywords: network neutrality, two sided markets, price discrimination, product differentiation, competition policy. 
JEL Classification Codes: C70, D43, L51, L52, L86. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The internet consists of a set of networks intended to the transportation of data packages. These 
packages are the unit item to provide a myriad of different services and applications such as e-mail, web 
browsing, voice communications, search services and linear and on-demand video distribution. The 
inventory of services delivered over the top (OTT) of internet networks is not a closed list, but rather a 
fast evolving catalogue with increasingly innovative applications and services appearing constantly. 
Since the conception of the internet regulation has preserved the principle that all data packages must 
be treated equally regardless the type of digital service being provided to internet users. This imply that 
networks are agnostic with respect to the OTT services been offered. Thus, there is not network support 
or aid to OTT service provision in terms of guarantying speed, delay or delay variability of packages. 
Furthermore, the slow down or blocking of a particular kind of internet traffic is forbidden. This 
regulatory principle is known as the network neutrality regulatory approach to internet access.  
From the economic standpoint, network neutrality means that internet providers are only enabled to 
charge consumers and content providers for connectivity and are not allowed to exert price 
discrimination to content providers regardless the profits they enjoy or the congestion they generate in 
the internet consumer’s local access network. It is neither possible for connectivity providers to 
differentiate the internet access product in terms of quality of connection, defined as higher quality the 
lower the delay.  
Network neutrality is a regulatory approach to internet access pricing by which business and residential 
internet consumers and content and application providers (CP) pay the price to access the internet 
access to their respective local Access Provider1 (AP). Additionally, there are payments among other 
internet network segment owners that are necessary to transport CPs´ traffic to internet users. APs only 
own or use one of the internet network segments, the access network, but that it is not enough to reach 
all the content and applications available on the Web. Consequently, APs need to interconnect to other 
network suppliers, e.g. backbone network providers, to be able to offer end to end communications. 
There are economic transactions among APs and Backbone Providers (BP). Backbone Providers either 
exchange traffic among them and pay an interconnection price to other BPs or agree to share their 
networks if net payments between them approximately compensate. Under network neutrality all 
payments are made linearly, therefore, the internet consumer’s local AP does not receive any payment 
from CPs generating traffic in a remote AP network; see Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.8: Network Neutrality Approach 
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Authors based on Economides and Tag (2012) 
If the consumer’s local AP is enabled to charge a fee either to consumers or more probably to CPs to 
differentiate connection quality, thus discriminating their ability to pay, the network neutrality paradigm 
would be broken. Under this approach, that Wu and Yoo (2006) denominated “network diversity”, 
traffic is not treated equally anymore and consumers and/or content and application providers could be 
charged for different qualities of internet connectivity; see figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.9: Network Diversity Approach 
 
Authors based on Economides and Tag (2012) 
There are multiple interrelated players and industries that are part of the digital goods and services 
provision value chain. Examples of such industries are content and application providers, device 
manufacturers, information systems designers, mobile and fixed internet network providers and digital 
advertising companies. Players include governments, regulators, the academia, ICT companies and 
citizens.  A framework describing the internet ecosystem can be found in García-Zaballos and González-
Herranz (2013). 
Content and application providers argue that network neutrality is the cornerstone for an open internet 
and has been responsible for the successful emergence of innovative applications and OTT services such 
as voice or video over IP. However, APs respond that the investments required to expand the access 
network and to adopt next generation technologies are threatened by network neutrality regulations. 
Opponents of network neutrality also maintain that the development of new technologies such as some 
applications of the internet of things would be endangered by network neutrality regulation.  
From the APs business model perspective, two forces are responsible for their request to abolish the 
network neutrality principle. Traffic demand is increasing exponentially, congesting fixed and especially 
mobile networks. This surge in demand is the result of the emergence of new devices such as tablets 
and smartphones, and the increasing usage of multimedia applications. For example, Netflix and Google 
are responsible for about 50% of downstream traffic in fixed networks during peak periods in the US2. 
There is also a shift underway in the balance among the agents in the value chain, away from the 
predominance of connectivity providers towards the increased importance of CPs3. In this context, the 
economic analysis of the different regulatory models for internet access is of utmost relevance for the 
expansion of internet networks and services.  
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APs claim that the value proposition underlying the creation of prioritized lanes for internet traffic is the 
reduction of delay and congestion, but with current technology, prioritization might be trying to solve 
technical problems that currently don´t exist. New technological developments such as protocols that 
reduce congestion, internet exchange points and peering techniques reduce data packages delivery cost, 
packages losses and latency and improve routing efficiency. After years of innovation in the delay effort-
less internet, it may be too late for APs to argue for a dedicated path as a solution for congestion and 
delay. Only very critical jitter and latency applications such as telemedicine may need a dedicated path 
and reserved internet node capacity. 
2. Related literature 
 
The impact of internet access regulation has been analyzed from different points of view. It has being 
scrutinized from a view of achieving different public policy objectives such as income redistribution and 
inequality reduction, ensuring freedom of speech and expression and guaranteeing consumer’s data 
privacy. A different perspective is to examine the topic from the competition policy angle by evaluating 
the impact of changes in regulation to effective competition, e.g. the effect of vertical and horizontal 
integrations in the value chain of internet service provision encouraged by regulatory modification.  
Finally, it has been studied from an economic efficiency perspective by calculating social welfare and by 
estimating the incentives to invest and innovate in internet network deployment and in the creation of 
new OTT services. The most efficient social solution is analyzed from the productive, Pareto and 
dynamic standpoints. The following paragraphs analyze existing material on these three ways of 
approaching the network neutrality debate, though this paper focus the analysis on the impact of 
internet access regulation on social welfare. 
One public policy objective is income redistribution. Examples of this kind of policy in the ICT industry 
are the obligations that telephone and internet access providers are required to comply with, like 
emergency call services, the rural and remote areas coverage requirements or the contributions to 
universal service funds. The asymmetric regulation of OTT and internet access services may pose 
concerns related to the different redistribution policy burden borne by companies providing similar 
services4. Based on this rationale, internet access providers claim for a level playing field. 
Notwithstanding, we don’t center the analysis on this topic since symmetric regulation may co-exist with 
network neutrality regulation.  
Another public policy objective is the safeguard of citizen’s freedom of expression and data privacy. An 
open internet has been regarded as a pre-requisite to safeguard free speech and privacy. Without 
network neutrality, APs may inspect consumer’s information or block some contents, thus reducing 
freedom of speech5. However, regulations limiting such practices can co-exist with the existence of 
priority internet traffic classes.  
In reference to internet regulation impact on competition, existing literature studies agents’ incentives 
to undertake anticompetitive behavior. Hemphill (2008) enumerates three network diversity potential 
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constraints to effective competition and analyses whether network neutrality is a correct regulatory 
response.  The first constraint is the potential market exclusion of CPs through abuse of dominance after 
the vertical integration of an AP with significant market power and a rival CP. Hemphill maintains that 
network neutrality is an unnecessary rule since antitrust laws already deal with the problem, e.g. the 
“Microsoft-Netscape6“case. However, this case might also exemplify how lengthy court proceedings may 
allow a monopolist to keep its market power endlessly. 
The second is the potential market exclusion of a CP through refusal to deal. An AP might have an 
incentive to block CP’s services that substitute legacy telecommunication services such as voice, text or 
videos, e.g. the case “AT&T versus Vonage7” in the US. Hemphill holds that a sound antitrust regulation 
would solve this problem with the only exception of exclusion of social production, e.g. Wikipedia. A fee 
for prioritized traffic may drive Wikipedia out of the market even if social production of online 
encyclopedias is more efficient than market production.  
Finally, a third problem, is the reduction of CP’s incentives to invest and innovate if APs charge a fee to 
CPs. Low investment incentives could also lead to reduced competition in the long run. Hemphill points 
out that internet access regulation is a joint problem since not only innovation in OTT services should be 
taken into account but also innovation in broadband infrastructure deployment.  
The innovation dilemma is also analyzed by Van Schewick (2006) and Wu and Yoo (2006). Van Schewick 
states that keeping innovation in content creation through network neutrality brings wider benefits than 
costs.  Wu explains that the key element to understand the impact of regulatory change is the 
economics of deployment of the last mile internet access network infrastructure. Abandoning network 
neutrality regulation would harm innovation and investment in OTT services provision in exchange for 
very limited help to solve the last mile infrastructure problem because of the existing lack of effective 
competition among internet access providers. However, Yoo considers that the spectrum-based internet 
access technologies are changing the economics of the last mile network, making competition feasible 
and the internet access market contestable. Under such assumption, changing network neutrality 
regulation would be an effective measure to solve the last mile network deployment problem. Earlier, 
Huergo (2004) had also identified the positive effect on competition of new technologies increasing 
efficiency of spectrum use.  Wright (2013) and Faulhaber (2011) point out that the elimination of 
network neutrality regulation should be subject to the rule of reason. Under this rule, the existence of 
prioritization should not be categorically prohibited in the absence of a demonstrated harm to 
competition. For Shin (2014), an effective regulatory strategy should include ex-ante principles, 
guidelines for acceptable practices and precompetitive regulations. 
An additional AP’s practice that should be analyzed from the competition perspective is the so called 
zero rating. It consists on the exemption of certain favored internet content from internet access users’ 
monthly data caps. The potential adverse effect to effective competition of such practice is similar to the 
exclusion of a CP happening when there is a vertical integration of an AP and rival CP. There is increasing 
support to ban or at least regulate this practice8. In developing countries, especially those where users 
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have very low ability to pay, this practice put the regulator in the dilemma of choosing between 
potential competition distortion and unaffordable access to internet content for most of the population. 
Theory of strategy may help us to obtain some qualitative intuition to understand market agents’ 
behavior towards competition. In this context, it is useful to use Porter’s (1991) five forces strategic 
framework to understand the impact of departing from network neutrality on the different industries 
involved. The application and CP’s industry would face decreased threat of new entrants and a lower 
threat of substitute products since a fee to content provision constitutes a new entry barrier. This 
industry would face a similar rivalry among competitors and bargaining power of buyers and highly 
increased bargaining power of suppliers. As a result CP’s industry would probably be less attractive with 
network diversity. 
The AP’s industry would face reduced bargaining power of some buyers -the CPs-, a very limited 
increased threat of new entrants due the existence of high sunk costs in network deployment, a fall in 
the threat of substitute products or services and increased own bargaining power. Bargaining power of 
suppliers and rivalry among competitors would remain the same as with network neutrality. As a result 
AP’s industry would probably be more attractive with network diversity. 
As we have seen, there exists diverse regulatory responses limiting anticompetitive behavior, for this 
reason, we consider that other regulatory gaps being filled, internet access regulation turns to be an 
economic efficiency maximization problem. Extant economic modeling approaches internet access 
regulation carrying out two non-mutually exclusive types of analysis. One approach is to examine how a 
regulatory change would affect social welfare in the short run, a different one is to analyze the effects of 
regulation on the investment incentives of CPs and APs in the long run. Network neutrality impact on 
social welfare is analyzed using two main types of methodologies. One approach is to use two-sided 
market models looking at cross externalities between the two sides of the market and equilibrium 
prices. Related literature can be found in Economides and Tag (2012), Armstrong (2006), Rochet and 
Tirole (2003, 2006), Nocke et al. (2007), Weyl (2010), Mialon and Banerjee (2013), Jay, Jeon and Kim 
(2014), Bourreau et al (2015). A second approach is to focus on measuring the impact of congestion 
management in total welfare in a context of bandwidth scarcity. This perspective is offered in 
Economides and Hermalin (2012), Hermalin and Katz (2007), and Cheng et al. (2006). 
Two-sided market research shows different conclusions. Armstrong (2006) found that the key 
determinants of equilibrium prices in a two-sided platform are the magnitude of the cross-group 
externalities, whether fees charged by the platform are lump-sum or per-transaction, and whether the 
agents have multi-homing possibilities9. Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Mialon and Banerjee (2013) 
maintain that the structure of the two-sided market is an important element to determine total welfare. 
The latter show that vertical relations among content and internet APs are a key element to calculate 
total welfare. On this same line of thought Jay, Jeon and Kim (2013) note that the impact of network 
neutrality crucially depends on the CP’s business model. Weyl (2010) offers a model in which users are 
heterogeneous in two dimensions, income and scale. Economides and Tag (2012) analyze the impact of 
 José Marino García García - Regulations and Strategies for the Digital Transformation                                                                     74 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Price discrimination of OTT providers under duopolistic competition and multidimensional product 
differentiation in retail broadband access 
 
regulation on network effects to determine the equilibrium prices charged by the platform and the 
resulting number of consumers and CPs. They find that for most parameter values, total surplus is higher 
at zero fee, thus, with network neutrality. 
Regarding congestion models Hermalin and Katz (2007) find that restricting a monopolist AP to have a 
single not differentiated product has the following effects: application providers looking for the low 
quality variant are excluded from the market, intermediate users enjoy higher and more efficient 
qualities than demanded, and top users suffer lower and less efficient qualities than desired. Total 
surplus may rise or fall depending on the parameters used. The extension to the duopolistic model show 
similar welfare effects. Cheng et al. (2007) use a game theoretic model approach in which congestion 
can be avoided paying for preferential access. They find that departing from network neutrality would 
benefit APs and hurt CP’s profit. Economides and Hermalin (2012) assume network congestion and find 
that network neutrality increases total welfare if the elasticity of content demand with respect to 
transmission time does not increase with households’ time sensitivity for content. 
Several studies analyze the impact of internet access regulation on the investment incentives of CPs and 
APs. Choi and Kim (2010), Cheng, Bandyopadhay and Guo (2011), Economides and Hermalin (2012, 
2015), and Njoroge et al (2013) analyze AP’s incentive to invest in network expansion and/or network 
upgrade to reduce congestion. Choi and Kim (2010), Economides and Hermalin (2012), Bourreau et al 
(2015) study CP’s incentives to enter the market or to invest in the creation of new contents and 
applications. Peitz and Schuett (2015), and Choi, Jeon Kim (2014) investigate CP’s incentives to invest in 
compression technologies to reduce congestion in fixed and mobile access networks.  
There also exists, although scarce, empirical literature on network neutrality. Ford et al (2010) study the 
impact of network neutrality in broadband deployment in rural areas and conclude that neutrality 
reduce network expansion to high-cost deployment rural areas.  Balezon (2010) analyzes the topic from 
the perspective of job creation in the US and finds that neutrality might pose a negative impact on 
broadband sector jobs. Clarke (2009) use simple quantitative modeling to show that neutrality may 
hinder the satisfaction of future video and other high bandwidth applications demand. Lee et al (2011) 
study four types of CPs with different sensitivity to traffic delay and measure network usage efficiency 
using a Tobit regression model. They find that establishing traffic classes don’t significantly decrease 
CP’s efﬁciency. 
The network neutrality dilemma has also entered the political agenda in the European Union and the 
US. In the US, new regulations10 have been passed after a long and tortuous political process. In the 
European Union, open Internet regulation has also been reviewed. Both economic areas recognize the 
importance of avoiding blocking and the slowing down of any digital service to guarantee competition, 
freedom of expression and consumer’s privacy. Both have passed regulation to impose network 
management transparency obligations to APs. However, there is a central point where approaches 
differ. US regulation prohibits the existence of paid prioritization of any kind whereas the European 
regulation has allowed for a different treatment specialized services provided that these services do not 
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harm the availability and quality of the open internet access. Examples of specialized services are IPTV, 
high definition videoconferencing, automated driving or healthcare services like remote surgery. 
National regulatory authorities have the obligation to examine traffic management practices to ensure 
that minimum quality of service requirements are fulfilled and open access is not damaged. In case of 
infraction, Member States would set effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.  
The aim of this paper is to study the economic efficiency of internet access regulation, assuming other 
regulatory concerns solved. In this sense, it is important to point out the difference between completely 
unregulated control of data packages and the allowance of prioritized traffic under regulatory control 
and open internet quality of service requirements. The first may pose risks to competition, freedom of 
expression and privacy whereas the second is an economic efficiency issue.  
3. The model 
 
We move the network neutrality debate to the issue of product differentiation of retail internet access 
in a multidimensional space and price discrimination among content providers. Our setup departs from 
the model described in Liu and Shuai (2015) -multidimensional product differentiation and endogenous 
and fixed firms’ location- to subsequently determine the equilibrium price of internet access and the 
quantity of internet content generated by CPs under different scenarios. We consider three potential 
scenarios and calculate total welfare for each; network neutrality (NN), network diversity (ND) operated 
by all APs, and ND used by one AP whereas the other continue acting under NN. The selection of one of 
the two ND scenarios might happen either as a result of the strategic behavior of APs or as a technology 
or market constraint in areas with very low population density11.  The elaboration of digital content is 
financed through internet advertising but we can expect similar results for content financed by internet 
consumers. The model is a sequential-moves game. APs move to a limited new well known locations 
when there is a change in regulation from NN to ND.  The sequential-moves game stages are the 
following: 
1. In the first stage APs select the internet access price. We calculate the equilibrium in all three 
possible scenarios assuming duopolistic Bertrand’s competition and the existence of a unique 
pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We also analyze in this stage the impact of a change in 
unit transport costs on the equilibrium price of internet access and on AP’s market share. The 
equilibrium is defined by the quadruplet    
     
     
    
 ). A summary of all the notations 
used in this paper is provided in Table 3.1. 
 
2. In the second stage, CPs choose the maximizing quantity of content to be provided      
    
   
in order to maximize their profit given the APs market shares calculated in the first stage. In the 
scenarios for which there exists prioritization, APs also choose simultaneously in this stage the 
optimal fee per unit of content per user to be charged to CPs.  
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We make five important market structure assumptions. First, firms have fixed location in their 
differentiation strategy because of existing regulation, technology constraints and market features such 
as the existence of economies of scope and other market structure limitations12. Whereas most of 
product differentiation literature focus on how firms locate using a first location then price type of 
game, Hotelling (1929), D’Aspremont et al (1979), Economides (1986) etc… We focus the analysis on the 
impact of unit transport costs on the equilibrium price of internet access. Second, in cases where the AP 
is allowed to offer prioritized traffic and prioritization is technically feasible, we assume that CPs will be 
price discriminated in such a way that all CPs whose service quality depend on delay or delay variability 
will pay for prioritization; the remaining CPs will provide their services using non-prioritized traffic 
regardless the existence or not of priority traffic for other services. We make this assumption based on 
the following rationale. Without  the possibility of prioritization, CPs offering delay sensitive services 
have been responsible for reducing delay and delay variability using techniques such as internet 
exchange points, peering or protocols that reduce congestion. However, the existence of traffic 
prioritization may pose an additional obstacle to the provision of a service with sufficient quality 
because of the increased network congestion if the CP does not pay for the prioritized traffic, thus the 
CP will pay for prioritization. Third, APs will charge the cost of prioritization only to CPs, thus, internet 
consumers will not be charged. We support this assumption in the two sided market features, for 
example because of the limits to impose payments only to consumers that use services that are 
susceptible of being prioritized, different demand elasticity in both sides of the market and the 
possibility to attract more internet consumers if they are not charged for prioritization, which benefit 
both APs and CPs. For similar reasons, we also consider that CPs are neither able to nor willing to pass 
this costs to internet consumers. These assumptions are common in the literature; see Rochet and Tirole 
(2006). The existence of prioritized traffic is regarded by consumers as an internet access product 
differentiation feature. Fourth, we assume internet access duopolistic provision; such assumption is 
underpinned by the existence of high sunk costs in network deployment that hinders market entry. 
Fifth, we assume for all scenarios that there is regulatory control over service blocking in order to 
prevent competition distortion and forced demand for priority that otherwise would not be requested. 
Sixth, CPs are independent monopolist in its own market, thus assuming a winner takes all type of 
content provision market. This assumption is also common in the literature; see for example 
Economides and Tag (2012). The analysis with different imperfect competition content provision market 
structures is left for future research. It is also important to note that the potential impact of departing 
from network neutrality regulation on investment incentives is also left for future research. We analyze 
the advisability of departing from network neutrality regulation in a context of duopoly in the market of 
internet access and horizontal product differentiation in a two dimensional space. One product 
differentiation feature is related to the preference that consumers place to delay or the delay variability 
of data packages, therefore linked to network neutrality regulation. Some consumers are reluctant to 
traffic prioritization because they use internet services for which prioritization cannot be appreciated. A 
network with prioritized traffic may increase congestion and reduce network capacity available for 
services that don’t require prioritization. Other group of users would be indifferent to prioritization 
because they neither use services susceptible to be prioritized nor require high internet capacity. Finally, 
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a third group would prefer prioritization because they use a set of internet services that include those 
sensitive to traffic delay or delay variability. Furthermore, APs will not be willing to charge internet 
consumers a premium price for prioritization because of the reasons explained in the third assumption 
of the previous paragraph. The other product differentiation feature models consumer preferences over 
a set of options offered by the AP to internet users, such as the set of other products bundled to 
internet access (e.g. fixed telephony, television, mobile data and voice…). Some consumers prefer to pay 
for a single product, broadband, so that they are not forced to pay for the other elements of the bundle 
that they don´t need, whereas others are willing to pay for the whole package. The latter are interested 
in all the products because the price of the bundle is usually lower than the sum of the individual prices 
due to the existence of economies of scope in the production of the components of the package.  A 
more detailed explanation of the differentiation dimensions can be found in section 3.1. The 
consideration of two-dimensional product differentiation is also a contribution to existing literature on 
network neutrality since existing studies only contemplate a single dimension. 
Table 3.5: List of notations13 
Notation Description 
   ,   Utility of a consumer that buy internet access either from AP A or B 
  Intrinsic value of internet connectivity for consumers 
   Ratio of content to the maximum content under perfect competition in each scenario 
  Proportion of prioritized content to total content in the market equilibrium 
   ̅ Waiting time with and without priority traffic 
  Marginal value that a consumer places on internet access bundled products per unit 
  Marginal value that a consumer places on internet access waiting time per unit 
  Dimension of product differentiation in terms of bundled products options 
  Dimension of product differentiation in terms of waiting time  
     ,     Quantity of content of a CP, content susceptible of prioritization and non-prioritized content 
    ,     Total quantity of content generated, and total prioritized and non-prioritized content 
     
    
  Relevance of a particular content, and relevance for internet consumers and advertisers 
      Marginal consumers indifferent to connect to either AP, touching the square horizontal lines 
   Price per user of the minimum amount of content of an internet service 
  Slope of the internet advertisement inverse demand curve 
     Total number of content providers 
  
      
  
 Number of providers that would and would not pay for prioritized traffic 
       Price of internet access of AP A and B 
      Price of advertising per unit of content per internet user 
     Function describing  the fee charged to a CP in network with prioritization 
  Marginal fee charged to a CP per unit of content  
                 Position of AP A and AP B in the product differentiation square 
              Distribution functions of consumers in dimensions x and y 
             Density functions of consumers in dimensions x and y 
       Market share of AP A and AP B 
  ,   ,   ̃   ̃ Profit of AP A and AP B in the neutral and discriminatory networks 
      Total producer surplus of APs 
   
      
    ̃  
     ̃ 
  
 Profit of a CP in the neutral and discriminatory network 
             Total surplus of advertisers, and surplus with prioritized and non-prioritized traffic 
          Surplus of an advertiser with prioritized and non-prioritized traffic 
        Consumer Surplus of internet consumers connected to AP A or APB 
   Total welfare  
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3.1 Access Provider’s location, product differentiation strategy and market share 
 
In our model there are two product differentiation dimensions. The x dimension is related to a set of 
products bundled to internet access. Providers can bundle internet access with a bunch of other 
different services like mobile internet access, IP television, mobile voice communications, fixed voice 
communications and video on demand distribution. Consumer’s utility varies depending on the 
preferences over the product bundle composition; see section 3.2.     
Internet access provision tends to be a horizontally integrated industry and the bundle of internet access 
with other services is an increasingly common contract offered to internet consumers. The so called 
quadruple play is a commercial bundle of voice, internet access, mobile communications and television 
services in a single commercial package. The economic reasoning behind bundling is the existence of 
economies of scope in the provision of telecommunication services. Bundled services share costs of 
production making the average total cost of the bundle lower than the sum of the individual costs. 
However, bundling can be constrained by factors like technology. For example, spectrum unavailability 
may limit the addition of mobile communications to a bundle since the number of mobile operators is 
limited by the amount of spectrum allocated. 
The y dimension represents how a user values package delay or a delay variation that is important for 
some internet services and applications. Content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to packet delivery 
delay. Some types of services such as voice communications over IP are sensitive to the delay, some 
others are sensitive to the variability of the delay like online gaming and other like file sharing are not 
sensitive to delay or delay variability at all. For the latter, the best effort approach of internet routing 
and package transportation is optimal. Consumers have different preferences when using the internet; 
some of them prefer services such as e-mail or file sharing whereas others also use online games 
frequently. Some consumers prefer prioritization because of the services they use, and others may 
prefer neutral networks to enjoy higher network capacity for services that cannot take advantage of 
prioritization. Consequently, APs locate their internet access products according to consumer 
preferences to maximize profit. A model extension enabling APs to charge a different price to the 
consumer segment that prefer prioritization remains for the development of further research. Although 
with current technology, prioritization is not qualitatively important for most internet services due to 
technological developments such as protocols that reduce congestion, internet exchange points and 
peering techniques that reduce packages losses and latency, this approach could be useful for new 
future innovative services that may highly depend on prioritization such as automated driving. This new 
services may increase the amount of consumers that prefer prioritization. 
There is another important feature of internet access, the connection speed. A higher speed allows for 
example for the transmission of higher definition video and enables the connection of increased number 
of devices, or persons using the internet in a household. We assume that all CPs will offer all possible 
technically feasible connection speeds, thus, in our model, speed is treated as a homogeneous feature 
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and not a distinguishable characteristic of internet access. A model extension considering the maximum 
speed limitation of some technologies, thus considering speed as a differentiation feature, remains for 
the development of further future research. 
We consider three possible internet access scenarios. Under network neutrality, regulation forces APs to 
offer standard quality of connection. With network diversity two possibilities are analyzed: a situation 
where both APs offer prioritized traffic and a scenario where one provider offer prioritized traffic and 
the other continue under the network neutrality paradigm.  
One reason for the co-existence of networks with prioritized and non-prioritized traffic is the presence 
of economies of density in the deployment of the access network infrastructure. For example, in rural 
areas there may exist only one fixed network due to the high cost of deployment of a second one. In this 
situation a fixed broadband provider offering prioritized traffic could coexist with a mobile broadband 
provider offering residential internet access without priority. The reason for the mobile operator to use 
NN would be the potential network congestion that may arise in the spectrum based access network if 
there exists prioritization. In a densely populated area the more plausible scenario would be the 
presence of two fixed broadband providers, both offering prioritized traffic.  
Another situation leading to the co-existence of networks with prioritized and non-prioritized traffic is 
the use of the access network by the incumbent and an entrant competitor under wholesale access 
network regulation. To this day, there is no regulation of prioritization on a mandated shared network 
so the incumbent might be able to offer prioritized traffic whereas the entrant would not. Figures 3.3, 
3.4 and 3.5 offer a representation of CP’s location and the consumer’s indifference curve for the three 
scenarios analyzed. 
There are two APs, AP A and AP B, located at different points of the square of consumer preferences. 
The location of APs in the square is fixed. Under network neutrality, AP A is located in one of the corners 
of the square (0, 1) meaning minimum number of product options and non-prioritized traffic and AP B is 
located in the corner (1, 1) maximum product options and prioritized traffic. Under network diversity 
there are two possibilities that can be observed in table 3.2. 
Table 3.6: Access provider’s location matrix 
                 
NN 0 1 1 1 
NDBOTH 0 0 1 0 
NDONE 0 1 1 0 
Source: Authors 
The line passing through         and        determines where consumers indifferent from buying 
internet access from AP A or AP B are located. This line represents the equilibrium in the internet access 
market, see section 4.1. Consumers to the left of this line buy internet access from AP A. Consumers to 
the right of the line buy internet from provider B. 
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Figure 3.10: Access provider’s market share under NN 
 
 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on Liu and Shuai (2015) 
 
Figure 3.11: Access provider’s market share under ND, both with prioritized traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on Liu and Shuai (2015) 
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Figure 3.12: Access providers’ market share under ND with prioritized and non-prioritized traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on Liu and Shuai (2015) 
 
3.2 Internet consumer’s utility 
 
Consumers are interested in different services and applications such as web browsing, online purchases, 
file transfers, video on demand or voice communications and choose an AP according to their tastes. 
Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences of internet usage in two dimensions x -preference 
over products bundled to internet access- and y -network quality in terms of reduced delay of data 
packages-. Consequently, APs differentiate among them by offering diverse internet access quality 
options and several related products bundled to internet access.  
The model captures consumer’s taste heterogeneity defining their utility using a two-dimensional 
hotelling framework; see Hotelling (1929). We provide an extended version of the one-dimensional 
model explaining consumer’s utility with multi-dimensional product features. Models describing 
products with multi-dimensional characteristics can be found in these extant studies; Tabuchi (1994), 
Irmen and Thisse (1998) and Liu and Shuai (2015)).  
Consumers are distributed according to their preferences in any position       of a square of length   x 
  according to two different distribution functions               where     is normalized to unity for 
simplicity. The sub-indexes 1 and 2 correspond to the first and second product differentiation 
dimensions. We use the notation              to describe the corresponding density functions. 
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The utility of a consumer connected to AP A and AP B is defined by:  
                
           
           
 
               
              
         
 
Where the parameters   and   are defined as follows 
       
  
     
 
  
      
   
    
  
  
 
  
     
  
    
    
   and    represent the utility enjoyed by internet users when connecting to AP A and AP B 
respectively,    is the intrinsic value that a consumer obtains from connecting to the internet,   captures 
the fact that the more content available the higher the utility. It is defined as the ratio of content 
generated by all CPs under the analyzed scenario to the maximum amount of content that would have 
been generated under perfect competition.   
  
 and    
  
 represent content susceptible of being 
prioritized and non-prioritized content under perfect competition.   
   and    
  are the prioritized and 
non-prioritized market equilibrium quantity of content provision under the analyzed  regulatory regime. 
We assume the value of the product      to be sufficiently large to cover all costs thus fulfilling the 
covered market condition. The parameter   is the marginal disutility that a consumers places on the 
internet product’s options when it doesn’t match their exact preferences,    is the marginal disutility 
that a consumers places on the waiting time,   captures the fact that the disutility of delay depends on 
the availability of prioritized content. It is defined as the proportion of prioritized content to total 
content in the market equilibrium14. The parameters   and   change its value under the different 
scenarios if content production varies. The terms    ,   ,     and      describe the location of AP A 
and AP B in the square and   and    are the variables representing all possible positions of consumers 
and APs in the square. The terms   and ̅  are the waiting time in the prioritized and non-prioritized 
networks 
For simplicity we normalize the positions of APs with regard to delay in such a way that the only possible 
values that can be taken in the y axis are 0 or 1, meaning that 1 is the waiting time under network 
neutrality and 0 is the waiting time in a prioritized network. Thus:  
                                                        ̅       ̅        
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3.3 Impact of a change in consumer preferences on market share 
 
We are looking for a Bertrand’s pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices where firms choose prices 
simultaneously. A sufficient condition for the existence of this PSNE is that the consumer distribution 
must be ϱ-concave as defined in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). 
Assumption 1 If the probability density functions             are ϱ-concave there always exists a PSNE 
in prices for any value of       and firm’s location. 
To determine each AP’s market share at equilibrium we identify the line where consumers obtain the 
same utility from connecting to any of the two existing APs:  
          
            
            
                 
           
       
For       marginal consumers indifferent to connect to AP A or AP B are located on the line:   
   
                   
     
           
     
   
             
  
            
             
  
    
  
Consumers to the left of this line buy internet access from AP A. Consumers to the right of the line buy 
internet from provider B. See figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Marginal consumers touching the horizontal lines 
of the square are located on the points        and        defined by the following expressions: 
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The demand function of each AP is given by the following expressions: 
            ∫                      
  
  
 
                  
 
Where         and        are the distribution functions of consumers in x and y,        is the density 
function of consumers in x and    and    are the market share of each AP. 
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A variation in    produces two different effects on the market share of each AP. A rotating effect, that 
also depends on     and a shifting effect, see figure 3.6. The rotating effect happens because the slope 
of the indifferent consumers’ line depends on   and    in such a way that a decrease in d or an increase 
in   or in   produces a clockwise rotation of the indifferent consumer line. The shifting effect happens 
because the magnitude of a shift resulting from a price change in    or    depends on  .  When prices 
remain unchanged only the rotating effect materializes. 
The magnitude of a shift is determined by the following expression: 
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
            
 
     
  
   
   
 
   
   
     
 
            
  
 
     
The variation of AP A’s market share when there is a shift is represented by: 
   
   
        
   
   
 ∫
      
   
       
  
  
 
     
  
The magnitude of the rotating effect is determined by: 
  
  
 
            
             
 
     
 
 
Figure 3.13: Shifting and rotating effect of a change in d,t 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on Liu and Shuai (2015) 
(Xo1,1) (0,1) (1,1) (Xf1,1) 
(Xo2,0) (Xf2,1) 
 (1,0) (0,0) 
Shift 
Rotation 
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It is important to note that if the marginal disutility that consumers place on product options   and 
waiting time   remain constant, a change in the regulatory regime might pose a rotation of the 
indifferent consumer’s line via  , meaning that a change in the quantity of content produced among 
regulatory regimes lead to different market structures in terms of consumers choosing AP A or AP B. 
3.4 Content Provider’s market definition and profit maximization problem  
 
CPs obtain revenue from the internet advertising and marketing industry. Advertisers want their ads to 
be published embedded in relevant content in order to increase sales. Content is more relevant for 
advertisers the more variety if offers, the more users can potentially consume the content and the more 
effective is the content to actually increase sales quota. Advertisers pay CPs a price per unit of content 
  (higher variety), number of internet users that can connect to the CP15   and content´s relevance    . 
The variable   measures the number of data packages per user required to provide the service,   the 
number of potential consumers and   content’s relevance. Content’s relevance has to components, the 
relevance for the internet consumer,   
  which measures the effective proportion of users that actually 
consume the content, and the relevance for the advertiser,   
  which is the ability of a content to 
produce a ‘click’ to the advertisement that materializes in sales16. The value of    is different for each CP. 
      
    
  
 
     
  
Content creation has only fixed costs that we normalize to be zero without loss of generality. Thus under 
network neutrality CPs are homogeneous in terms of costs. In the discriminatory network, however CPs 
are heterogeneous in terms of costs because of the imposed liability for prioritization charged by APs to 
those CPs that can increase quality through traffic prioritization. There are a number of CPs     of 
which   
  
 will be forced to pay a fee for traffic prioritization and a number     
  
  that will not be forced 
to pay because service quality do not depend on delay or delay variability.  
       
      
    
 
     
  
CPs are independent monopolist in their own market; consequently they do not compete with each 
other. We assume inverse lineal demand for content from advertisers where the intercept of each 
individual demand is different meaning that different services have different data requirements. The 
factor of relevance    that is also different for each content provider.  
               
                            
  
Where          is the price of advertising,        is the price of advertising per unit of content,   is the 
quantity of content generated by a CP per user and   and   are the slope and the intercept of the 
individual content demand line of each content provider. Internet services have different requirements 
in terms of data packages to provide the service; therefore    vary for each CP. 
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In prioritized networks there is a fee per unit of content per user charged by the AP to the content 
provider that also depends on     . We assume that the function is a straight line whose slope is       ,   
can be interpreted as the marginal fee per unit of content. 
                        
  
In situations where       is the function describing the fee charged to CPs per unit of content per user 
from the AP in case of a prioritized network. 
Under Network Neutrality each CP’s profit can be described by the following expression.  
                
           
 
     
  
Under network Diversity where both APs impose priority CP’s profit can be described by the following 
expressions. 
  
                 
                  
  
   
                
       
 
     
  
Where   
  
 represent the profit of a content provider paying for prioritization and    
  
 is the profit of a 
content provider that is not paying. 
Under network diversity where one AP impose priority the other continue under NN, CP’s profit can be 
described by the following expressions 
{
  
                
                
   
                
                 
 
 
     
(24) 
  
Content provider’s maximization problem for prioritized and non-prioritized content is defined as 
follows: 
   ⏟
 
  
         
                               
  
   ⏟
 
   
        
                    
 
     
  
Where       { 
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3.5 Access provider’s market definition and profit maximization problem   
 
We assume duopolistic provision of internet access. This assumption is underpinned in the existence of 
high sunk costs in network deployment. APs obtain revenue from consumers that pay a price for 
accessing the internet. With network diversity, there are two sources of revenue, the internet access 
price and a fee obtained from CPs whose services need prioritization. 
Under Network Neutrality APs profit only depends on the number of consumers connected: 
         
         
 
     
(28) 
Under network diversity if both AP prioritize traffic, profit is defined by: 
          
        
          
        
 
     
(30) 
  
Under network diversity with one AP imposing priority and the other continuing under NN paradigm 
profit is defined by: 
        
 
          
         
     
 
(32) 
  
Where   
   is the sum of content generated by all content providers paying for prioritization per user.  
In our sequential game, APs solve two maximization problems; first they maximize their profit with 
respect to the consumer’s internet connection price. Subsequently APs maximize profit with respect to 
the fee charged to CPs, once CPs have selected their optimal quantity of content to produce. In case of a 
network with traffic prioritization, maximization problems can be written as follows: 
 
   ⏟
  
           
                         [   ]      
 
  
   ⏟
 
     
    
                 
                        [   ]      
In case of a neutral network APs only maximize profit with respect to the price of connection. 
   ⏟
  
                    [   ]       
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3.6 Internet advertiser’s market definition and consumer surplus  
 
Advertising agencies finance the elaboration of digital content and services consumed by internet users 
in order to promote the sale of different products. Advertisers obtain a ‘consumer surplus’ cs from the 
market of digital services production equal to the difference between what they are willing to pay per 
unit of content distributed to internet users and how much they actually pay. APs are able to price 
discriminate services valuing prioritization from other services if network diversity is allowed. In our 
model, APs are able to extract all the benefits obtained from such price discrimination. 
Under Network Neutrality the CS of each advertiser per content provider per internet user is defined by 
the following expression:  
     
       
                   
 
 
     
 
Under network diversity if both AP prioritize traffic,    for prioritized traffic is described as follows 
      
       
 (  
    )   
            
 
 
     
 
Consumer surplus in a non-prioritized network is equal to 
       
       
 (   
 )   
            
 
  
 
     
Under network diversity with one AP imposing priority and the other continuing under NN, CS from 
prioritized traffic is described as follows 
     
       
 (  
    )   
             
 (   
 )    
       
 
  
 
     
Consumer Surplus from non-prioritized traffic is equal to 
       
       
 (   
 )   
            
 
  
 
     
3.7 Total welfare 
 
Total welfare is defined by the following expression 
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Where     is the total welfare composed by the producer surplus of APs     , the producer surplus of 
CPs      , the consumer surplus of advertisers    ,and the consumer surplus of internet users,   .  
4 Equilibrium in the internet access, content distribution and internet advertising 
markets for different scenarios  
 
4.1 Equilibrium price of internet access, equilibrium quantity of content generated and 
total welfare under network neutrality  
 
Under NN there is no difference in terms of delay in both AP’s networks, consequently the location of 
the two APs is given by          . Under NN the only differentiation strategy is to offer services 
bundled with the internet access different of those of the competition. In our model AP A choose to 
offer only internet access whereas AP B offer a set of bundled services, thus             . 
Consumers obtaining the same utility from connecting to any of the two existing CPs are described by:  
          
                              
                
Marginal consumers indifferent to connect to AP A or AP B are located at the vertical line: 
   
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
Marginal consumers touching the horizontal lines of the square are located at 
   
        
  
 
 
 
 
     
                    
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
As we are looking for a Bertrand PSNE, in the equilibrium   
    
   therefore: 
     
    
   
 
 
 
The shifting effect is defined by: 
   
   
 
   
   
    
 
   
 
        
   
 
   
   
    
 
   
 
     
 
Under NN there is no rotation effect; AP’s profit is determined by market share and price of connection  
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Proposition 1: In the first stage of the sequential-moves game in the unique pure strategy Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium, firms split the market       
 
 
  and choose a price: 
 
    
    
  
 
  (
 
 )
 
Proof. See appendix 
 
Proposition 2: Equilibrium price varies with a change in internet consumer preferences in the product 
options dimension    according to the following expression:   
 
   
  
 
 
  (
 
 )
 
Proof: See appendix 
Proposition 3: Under network neutrality, in the second stage of the sequential-moves game, the 
equilibrium quantity of content per user generated by a CP and the total equilibrium quantity of content 
per user is equal to:  
   
   
  
                ∑
   
  
   
   
 
Proof. See appendix 
Proposition 4: After the two stages of the sequential moves game, total welfare described as the sum of 
producer surplus of access providers and content providers and the consumer surplus of internet users 
and advertisers is defined by the expressions below: 
The profit obtained by AP A is      
 
  (
 
 
)
   , the profit obtained by AP B is     
 
  (
 
 
)
     and 
      
 
 
  , therefore total producer surplus of access providers is: 
           
 
  (
 
 )
 
The profit obtained by each content provider is       
       
  
    
  , therefore total producer surplus is 
equal to: 
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(∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
) 
The consumer surplus of all the advertisers is the sum of the surpluses of all advertisers 
   
 
  
∑    
 
   
   
         
 
  
(∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
) 
The consumer surplus of internet consumers is  
   
   ∫ ∫             
              
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
   ∫ ∫             
              
 
  
 
 
 
 
Total welfare is 
   
 
  (
 
 )
 
 
  
(∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
)                    
                   
 
Proof. See appendix 
 
4.2 Equilibrium price of internet access, tax charged to content providers and quantity of 
content in a discriminatory network where both APs offer prioritized traffic  
 
Under ND where both APs offer prioritized traffic the location of the two APs is given by     
     . In the model AP A choose to offer only internet access whereas AP B offer a set of bundled 
services, thus             . Consumers obtaining the same utility from connecting to any of the 
two existing CPs are described by:  
          
                         
            
Marginal consumers indifferent to connect to AP A or AP B are located at the vertical line: 
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The result is identical to that obtained in the NN case, therefore marginal consumers touching the 
horizontal lines of the square are located at     
        
  
 
 
 
     
        
  
 
 
 
  ,                       
    
   
     
    
   
 
 
  and the shifting effect is defined by  
   
   
 
   
   
    
 
   
         
   
   
 
   
   
    
 
   
    As 
in the NN case there is no rotation effect. 
The expressions for price and the impact of a variation in consumer preferences obtained in 
propositions 1 and 2 for the NN case are equivalent to the discriminatory network where both APs offer 
prioritized traffic.  
Proposition 5: Under network diversity where both APs offer prioritized traffic the equilibrium tax 
charged by the AP to the CP is defined by: 
    
∑   
  
  
   
  
   
Therefore equilibrium quantity of prioritized and non-prioritized content generated by a CP is 
  
  
 
  
[   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]          ;            
  
   
  
 
Total prioritized and non-prioritized content per internet user is  
  
  ∑
   
  
  
  
   
                      
   ∑
   
  
   
  
   
 
Total internet traffic in each network is 
     
     
   
 
  
[∑
   
 
  
  
   
 ∑  
   
  
   
] 
Proposition 6: After the two stages of the sequential moves game, total welfare described as 
the sum of producer surplus of access providers and content providers and the consumer 
surplus of internet users and advertisers is defined by the expressions below: 
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The profit obtained by CPs prioritizing and non-prioritizing traffic is   
   
         
  
(   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
and     
    
       
  
    
 . The total profit for all CPs, producer surplus in the content 
provision market is: 
      
 
  
 [∑  (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
  
  
   
] 
The producer surplus defined as the sum of profit of AP A and AP B is 
     
 
  (
 
 )
 
 
    
  ∑  
 
  
  
   
 
The consumer surplus of all the advertisers is the sum of the surpluses of advertisers that pay for 
prioritization     
 
   
[∑       
∑   
  
  
   
   
    
  
  
   ]  and those that do not pay      
       
  
∑     
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The consumer surplus of internet users is 
   
    ∫ ∫             
               
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ∫ ∫             
               
 
  
 
 
 
 
Total welfare is 
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]        
Proof. See appendix 
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4.3 Equilibrium price of internet access, tax charged to content providers and quantity of 
content in a discriminatory network where one AP is offering prioritized traffic and the 
other is acting as under network neutrality regulation 
 
In this case APs can differentiate in the two differentiation dimensions: network quality and bundling 
options. We assume one AP will choose to create traffic classes whereas the other will continue using 
the best effort approach. In this situation  ̅    and             . In our model AP A choose to 
offer only internet access whereas AP B offer bundled services, thus             . Consumers 
obtaining the same utility from connecting to any of the two existing CPs are described by:  
            
            
                 
           
       
   ̃     ̃     
                             
          
Marginal consumers indifferent to connect to AP A or AP B are located at the following line 
 ̃   
              
   
 
 
  
  
 
     
Marginal consumers touching the horizontal lines of the square are located at 
  ̃  
               
  
         
     
  ̃  
               
  
 
     
 
As we are looking for a Bertrand PSNE, in the equilibrium       therefore 
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The shifting effect is defined by: 
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And the rotating effect by: 
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Proposition 7: Under network diversity  when one firm prioritize and the other doesn´t and  firms are 
located in the upper left and lower right of the square in the unique PSBNE firms split the market  
      
 
 
  and choose a price: 
     
    
  
 
∫             
  
  
 
Proof: See appendix  
Proposition 8: Under network diversity when one firm prioritizes and the other doesn’t, equilibrium 
price may increase or decrease with a change in consumer preferences in either product differentiation 
dimension depending on  the signs of the partial derivatives shown as follows.  
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Proof: See appendix 
Proposition 9: Under network diversity where one APs offer prioritized traffic and the other operates 
under NN, the equilibrium tax charged by the AP to the CP in the discriminatory network is defined by:                                                                                                                                                                     
    
         ∑   
  
  
   
   
     
 
Prioritized and non-prioritized content per content provider and internet user is 
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∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]                                       
  
   
  
 
Total prioritized and non-prioritized content per internet user is 
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   ∑
   
  
   
  
   
 
Total traffic in all networks is 
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Proof: See appendix 
Proposition 10: After the two stages of the sequential moves game, total welfare described as the sum 
of producer surplus of access providers and content providers and the consumer surplus of internet 
users and advertisers is defined by the expressions below: 
The producer surplus of access providers is  
           
  
∫                
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The producer surplus of content providers is  
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) 
The consumer surplus of advertisers is  
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Internet user’s consumer surplus is 
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Total Welfare is 
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Proof. See appendix 
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5. Simulations  
 
In this section we offer systematic simulations using feasible ranges for parameters value to help discern 
the impact of departing from network neutrality regulation on social welfare. The objective of the 
simulations is to fill the gaps that cannot be easily explained using only mathematical analysis. A 
summary of the main parameters value used in the simulations can be consulted in annex 2.  
5.1 Methodology 
 
The model considers three different broadband access price discrimination scenarios. Under network 
neutrality, regulation forces APs to provide treat all data packages equally and uniform pricing. With 
network diversity two options are analyzed. One option with both APs offering prioritized traffic and a 
case where one AP offers prioritized traffic and the other standard quality. The two latter cases might 
coexist at the same time in different geographical areas. For example, in densely populated areas both 
APs may be willing to charge for traffic prioritization whereas in rural locations prioritization may be 
suitable only for one AP.  
Simulations are carried out considering two different distributions of consumers on preferences for each 
price discrimination scenario, uniform and normal distributions. Furthermore, we consider four different 
combinations of feasible ranges of the relevance    and the price of content    parameters. The four 
options are the result of combining concentrated and disperse ranges for each of these two parameters. 
The values for        have been generated randomly using Montecarlo simulation modelling. 
Consequently, for each price discrimination scenario we present eight tabulated values, four of them 
corresponding to the normal distribution function and other four to the uniform distribution. 
 
5.2 Simulation results 
 
We present simulation results in tables showing total welfare and each of its components -producer 
surplus of access providers, producer surplus of content providers, consumer surplus of internet 
advertisers and the consumer surplus of internet users-. Results are expressed as a proportion of the 
consumer’s intrinsic value of internet connectivity   which is set to 1. Together with the tables we also 
present the standard deviation values.  
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Table 7.3: Total Welfare 
TOTAL WELFARE 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.5566205 0.6167692 0.5774567 0.6849972 
Normal 0.5228772 0.5831186 0.5437084 0.6512734 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.4053743 0.4555483 0.4206971 0.5087805 
Normal 0.3830296 0.4344061 0.3983819 0.4873571 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.4127036 0.4547915 0.4278398 0.5088357 
Normal 0.4127169 0.4562172 0.4281580 0.5113532 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.8: Total welfare standard deviation 
TOTAL WELFARE (Standard deviation) 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0052771 0.0093293 0.0103178 0.0239929 
Normal 0.0052520 0.0094216 0.0103491 0.0241024 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0059820 0.0158290 0.0060209 0.0167423 
Normal 0.0057773 0.0145019 0.0059049 0.0165380 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0059352 0.0140984 0.0065157 0.0165960 
Normal 0.0071922 0.0184738 0.0073156 0.0183097 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.9: Producer surplus of Access providers 
 
PRODUCER SURPLUS OF APs 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0600000 0.0600000 0.0600000 0.0600000 
Normal 0.0376295 0.0376295 0.0376295 0.0376295 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0771816 0.0865538 0.0777343 0.0866442 
Normal 0.0548111 0.0641833 0.0553638 0.0642738 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.3316551 0.3308434 0.3330778 0.3401585 
Normal 0.3316551 0.3308434 0.3330778 0.3401585 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.10: Standard deviation of the producer surplus of Access providers 
PRODUCER SURPLUS OF APs (Standard 
Deviation) 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
Normal 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0009280 0.0044888 0.0016176 0.0038369 
Normal 0.0009280 0.0044888 0.0016176 0.0038369 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0087615 0.0362713 0.0115402 0.0305613 
Normal 0.0087615 0.0362713 0.0115402 0.0305613 
Source: Authors 
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Table 3.11: Producer surplus of content providers 
PRODUCER SURPLUS OF CPs 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0772727 0.1257934 0.0939196 0.1800584 
Normal 0.0772727 0.1257934 0.0939196 0.1800584 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0507983 0.0938380 0.0629000 0.1341425 
Normal 0.0507983 0.0938380 0.0629000 0.1341425 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0581276 0.0930811 0.0700427 0.1341978 
Normal 0.0581276 0.0930811 0.0700427 0.1341978 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.12: Standard deviation of the producer surplus of content providers 
PRODUCER SURPLUS OF CPs (Standard 
Deviation) 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0041189 0.0079409 0.0083963 0.0196852 
Normal 0.0041189 0.0079409 0.0083963 0.0196852 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0032900 0.0051562 0.0045561 0.0132643 
Normal 0.0032900 0.0051562 0.0045561 0.0132643 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0034586 0.0043909 0.0053945 0.0139830 
Normal 0.0034586 0.0043909 0.0053945 0.0139830 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.13: Consumer surplus, advertisers 
CONSUMER SURPLUS OF ADVERTISERS 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0193182 0.0314483 0.0234799 0.0450146 
Normal 0.0193182 0.0314483 0.0234799 0.0450146 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0126996 0.0234595 0.0157250 0.0335356 
Normal 0.0126996 0.0234595 0.0157250 0.0335356 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0126996 0.0234595 0.0157250 0.0335356 
Normal 0.0126996 0.0234595 0.0157250 0.0335356 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.14: Standard deviation of the consumer surplus of advertisers 
CONSUMER SURPLUS OF ADVERTISERS 
(Standard Deviation) 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0010297 0.0019852 0.0020991 0.0049213 
Normal 0.0010297 0.0019852 0.0020991 0.0049213 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0008225 0.0012890 0.0011390 0.0033161 
Normal 0.0008225 0.0012890 0.0011390 0.0033161 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0008225 0.0012890 0.0011390 0.0033161 
Normal 0.0008225 0.0012890 0.0011390 0.0033161 
Source: Authors 
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Table 3.15: Consumer surplus 
CONSUMER SURPLUS OF USERS 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.4000296 0.3995275 0.4000573 0.3999242 
Normal 0.3886568 0.3882474 0.3886794 0.3885708 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.2646948 0.2516970 0.2643378 0.2544581 
Normal 0.2647206 0.2529252 0.2643931 0.2554052 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0102214 0.0074074 0.0089942 0.0009438 
Normal 0.0102346 0.0088331 0.0093124 0.0034612 
Source: Authors 
Table 3.16: Standard deviation of the consumer surplus 
CONSUMER SURPLUS OF USERS  
(Standard Deviation) 
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Concentrated     
Disperse     
Disperse     
Network Neutrality 
Uniform 0.0003435 0.0016075 0.0004788 0.0012507 
Normal 0.0002801 0.0013109 0.0003904 0.0010200 
Network Diversity Both APs 
Uniform 0.0029635 0.0154818 0.0048478 0.0124493 
Normal 0.0026721 0.0139662 0.0043769 0.0112378 
Network Diversity One AP 
Uniform 0.0063278 0.0248572 0.0081416 0.0216809 
Normal 0.0049127 0.0199791 0.0062969 0.0166440 
Source: Authors 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We present a model to analyze total welfare in two sided markets where there is imperfect competition; 
the platform is able to differentiate its product in multiple dimensions on one side and to price 
discriminate on the other side. The model has been customized to analyze the impact of different 
internet access regulatory regimes on total welfare but with not very significant changes it could be used 
to undertake other different type of industrial organization and regulatory analysis in markets with 
similar structures. 
The model aims to shed some light on the immediate effect of a regulatory action on total welfare. It is 
not intended to measure the impact of regulation in the long run. In other words, it doesn´t evaluate the 
incentives of APs and CPs to invest and innovate in the future. This calculation is left for future research. 
However, we consider the immediate impact of the regulatory action more suitable since only a 
percentage of the new available to APs resources may be used for network expansion and innovation. 
The elaboration of digital content is financed through internet advertising but we can expect similar 
results for content financed by internet consumers. We leave this analysis for future research. 
Conclusions are drawn from simulation results and from the set of propositions described throughout 
the paper. Proofs can be found on appendix A. Tables comparing propositions for the three different 
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internet access scenarios are provided in Annex 1. Simulation result tables are available in section 5.2, 
and parameter values used in the simulation can be found in Annex2.  
Abandoning network neutrality regulation reduces the quantity of internet content produced according 
to propositions 6 and 10. Network diversity produces a significant reduction of prioritized content while 
the quantity of content non-susceptible of being prioritized remains unchanged. The reduction in the 
quantity of content is equal in the two network diversity scenarios – both and only one AP prioritizing - 
thus, even when only one AP offers prioritized content the reduction is materialized on equal footing.   
According to propositions 4 and 6, under network diversity APs enjoy higher income coming from the 
tax charged to CPs for prioritization but CPs offering prioritized content, and advertisers suffer an 
income reduction. Income reduction depends on the sum of prices paid by advertisers    to CPs and also 
on consumer preferences when only one AP offer prioritization. Firms supplying non-prioritized content 
enjoy the same surplus. Abandoning network neutrality has two different types of effects on consumer’s 
utility. On one hand, it reduces utility through a decrease in the value of   –ratio of content actually 
available to content available with perfect competition-, on the other hand, the disutility caused by the 
delay of data packages is reduced via   –ratio of prioritized content to content not susceptible of 
prioritization -.  The simulation is necessary to measure net impact. 
According to propositions 2 and 8, a change in the regulatory regime would lead to different internet 
access market structures because there is a rotation of the indifferent consumer´s line via changes in  . 
Even when the marginal disutility that consumers place on product options   and waiting time   remains 
constant, the change in    would rotate the indifferent consumer´s line.  
Results are expressed with respect to    which is set to 1.   is the maximum utility that a consumer 
could obtain with perfect competition in the provision of internet content thus with maximum 
availability of content. However, consumers usually don’t enjoy   but    where the multiplier   lowers 
utility when there is reduced competition and/or a tax on content production. 
Simulations show that network neutrality regulation is welfare superior to network diversity under the 
model assumptions with the values and value ranges given to parameters. Departing from network 
neutrality regulation leads to an abrupt decrease of the consumer surplus of internet users, from 0.4 to 
between 0.01 and 0.26. This effect weights much more in total welfare than the increase in APs surplus 
coming from the tax charged to content providers.  
The increase in the producer surplus of access providers, from 0.06 to a maximum of 0.34 is not enough 
to compensate the reduction of the consumer surplus of internet users. Among the two network 
diversity scenarios, results are very similar with slightly higher total welfare results in the case of only 
one CP offering prioritized traffic. Disperse range of parameter values for    and    tend to produce 
higher total welfare.  
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We can set a monetary value for   to make simulation results more intuitive. For example, if we set   to 
150$ per month the simulation shows that total welfare would range from 57$ to 102$, consumer’s 
utility between 1$ to 60$, and average ARPU for APs between 9$ to 51$, for CPs between 8$ to 20$, and 
for advertisers between 2$ to 6.8$. Although, the values for        have been generated randomly using 
Montecarlo simulation modelling, they have a significant relation with real observed ARPU values17. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
AP A’s profit with network neutrality is equal to                    , where     
        
  
 
 
 
  and  
   
   
   
 
   
 , taking the derivative of  
   with respect to    we obtain the price in the equilibrium   
 .  As we are looking for the Pure Strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium we 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
Using the results from proposition 1   
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  aking the derivative of    
  with respect to   we obtain the effect of a change in d on 
the equilibrium price: 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
We defined each C ’s p ofit with the following exp ession                            =                        Taking the derivative of  
    with respect to    and making this expression equal to zero (F.O.C.) we can calculate the equilibrium quantity per CP: 
   
  
  
                         
  
   
  
 
The total content per internet user is the sum of the content transmitted by all CP   
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Proof of Proposition 4 
From proposition 3 we know that    
   
  
 the efo e we can calc late each C  p ofit as an exp ession of    and   
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The sum of the profit of all CPs is the producer surplus in the content provision market 
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Under Network Neutrality the profit of APs is defined by           and           and   
    
  
 
  (
 
 
)
  and       
 
 
  then 
           
 
  (
 
 )
 
We defined the consumer surplus of each advertiser per unit of content per user under NN as  
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The consumer surplus of all the advertisers is the sum of the surpluses of all advertisers 
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We can also write it in terms of   
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Total consumer surplus of internet users is defined by 
        
      
   
Where    
   is the consumer surplus of users connected to AP A and    
   is the consumer surplus of users connected to AP B and 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
We defined each A ’s p ofit  nde  netwo k dive sity with both A  p io itizing t affic  sing the following exp essions 
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Taking the derivative of     with respect to   and making this expression equal to zero (F.O.C) we calculate the equilibrium T for 
prioritized traffic 
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Results are identical for AP B 
If both APs offer prioritized traffic, the profit for each CP with prioritized traffic is defined by: 
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Taking the derivative of    
  
 with respect to    and making this expression equal to zero (F.O.C.) we calculate the equilibrium quantity 
per CP for prioritized traffic 
   
  
  
                                
  
    
  
  
 
We defined each non-p io itized C ’s p ofit with the following exp essions 
   
                      
Equilibrium quantity of content is defined by 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
Each CP profit in the networks that prioritize traffic is 
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Total profit for all CPs is the producer surplus in the content provision market 
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Under network diversity if both AP prioritize traffic           
        and  
          
         ,   
    
  
 
  (
 
 
)
,   
  ∑
   
  
  
  
   
 ,     
∑   
  
  
   
  
    and       
 
 
 
                
     
 
  (
 
 
)
  ∑
   
  
  
  
   
∑   
  
  
   
   
      
     
 
  (
 
 )
 
 
    
  ∑  
 
  
  
   
 
 
We defined the consumer surplus of each advertiser per unit of content per user if the two networks offer prioritization for contents that 
pay for it  as       
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We defined the consumer surplus of each advertiser per unit of content per user if the two networks offer prioritization for contents that 
do not pay for it as        
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The consumer surplus of all the advertisers is the sum of the surpluses 
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Internet consumers consumer surplus in case of ND both offering prioritized traffic is 
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Proof of Proposition 7 
AP B’s profit is  
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 Taking the derivative of     with respect to    we obtain   
 . As we are looking for the pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium    
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Proof of Proposition 9 
We defined each p io itized C ’s p ofit with the following exp essions 
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Taking the derivative of     with respect to   and making this expression equal to zero we can calculate the equilibrium T for prioritized 
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We defined each non-p io itized C ’s p ofit with the following exp essions 
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Total prioritized content per internet user 
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Proof of Proposition 10 
Each CP profit in the networks that prioritize traffic is 
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Total profit of all CPs is the producer surplus in the content provision market 
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Internet user’s consumer surplus in case of ND where one AP offers prioritized traffic and the other non-prioritized traffic  
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Fundamental mathematical expressions for each scenario 
NN ND both prioritizing ND one prioritizing 
 
         
               
 
            
              
 
 
   
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
    
    
  
 
  (
 
 
)
 
 
 
            
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ∑
   
  
   
   
 
 
         
          
 
            
          
 
 
   
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
  
 
  (
 
 
)
 
 
            
  
 
    
∑   
  
  
   
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
[   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ] 
 
   
  
   
  
 
 
  
  ∑
   
  
   
  
   
 
    
 
  
[∑
   
 
  
  
   
 ∑  
   
  
   
] 
 
         
              
 
            
          
 
 
 
  ̃  
      
  
                 ̃  
      
  
 
 
 
     
    
  
 
∫             
  
  
 
 
            
  
 
    
         ∑   
  
  
   
   
  
   
 
 
  
  
 
  
[   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ] 
 
   
  
   
  
 
 
  
  ∑
   
  
   
  
   
 
    
 
  
[∑
   
 
  
  
   
 ∑  
   
  
   
] 
 
Results for producer surplus of access and content providers and consumer surplus of advertisers and users 
     
NN ND both prioritizing ND one prioritizing 
 
  (
 
 
)
  
  (
 
 
)
 
 
    
  ∑  
 
   
  
   
 
  
∫                  
  
  
 
 
    
  ∑  
 
   
  
   
 
     
NN ND both prioritizing ND one prioritizing 
 
  
 [ ∑    
 
  
  
   
  ∑    
 
   
  
   
] 
 
  
 [∑  (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
  
  
   
] 
 
  
 [
 
 
∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
] 
    
NN ND both prioritizing ND one prioritizing 
 
   
[ ∑    
 
  
  
   
  ∑    
 
   
  
   
] 
 
   
 [∑      
∑   
  
  
   
   
   
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
] 
 
   
 [( ∑  [   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]
   
  
   
  ∑    
 
   
  
   
)] 
    
NN ND both prioritizing ND one prioritizing 
 
 
   
   ∫ ∫             
              
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   ∫ ∫             
              
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ∫ ∫             
               
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ∫ ∫             
               
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ∫ ∫             
                  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   ∫ ∫      (    )        
              
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    ∫ ∫   (    )       
               
  
 
 
 
 
 
∫ ∫             
             
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 José Marino García García - Regulations and Strategies for the Digital Transformation                                                                     115 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Price discrimination of OTT providers under duopolistic competition and multidimensional product 
differentiation in retail broadband access 
 
 
Difference in total welfare between network neutrality regulation and network diversity, both APs offering prioritized traffic 
         =
 
  
∑     
   
  
   
 -∑   (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
   
∑     
    
  
   
             
Difference in total welfare between network neutrality regulation and network diversity, one AP offering prioritized traffic and the other 
offering network neutrality  
          
 
  (
 
 
)
 
  
∫                
  
  
 
 
  
(
 
 
∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
)  
 
    
  ∑  
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
 [( ∑  [   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]
   
  
   
  ∑    
 
   
  
   
)]              
 
 
The difference in total welfare between network neutrality regulation and network diversity, both APs offering prioritized traffic is: 
              -      
 
  (
 
 
)
 
 
  
(∑     
   
  
   
 ∑     
    
  
   
)       [
 
  (
 
 
)
  
 
   
 [∑   (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 ∑     
    
  
   
  
  
   
]       ]= 
 
  
∑     
   
  
   
 -
∑   (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
   
∑     
    
  
   
             
         =
 
  
∑     
   
  
   
 -∑   (   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  )
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
   
∑     
    
  
   
             
The difference in total welfare between network neutrality regulation and network diversity, one APs offering prioritized traffic and the other 
offering network neutrality is: 
              -
      
 
  (
 
 
)
 
 
  
(∑     
   
  
   
 ∑     
    
  
   
)       [
  
∫                
  
  
 
 
    
  ∑   
   
  
   
  
 
  
(
 
 
∑     
   
  
   
 ∑     
    
  
   
)    
 
   
 [( ∑   [   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]
 
  
  
   
 
 ∑     
    
  
   
)]       ] 
          
 
  (
 
 
)
 
  
∫                
  
  
 
 
  
(
 
 
∑    
 
  
  
   
 ∑    
 
   
  
   
)  
 
    
  ∑  
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
 [( ∑  [   
∑   
  
  
   
   
  ]
   
  
   
  ∑    
 
   
  
   
)]              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 José Marino García García - Regulations and Strategies for the Digital Transformation                                                                     116 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Price discrimination of OTT providers under duopolistic competition and multidimensional product 
differentiation in retail broadband access 
 
 
Annex 2: Simulation values and ranges for parameters value 
 
 
Number of content providers offering prioritized content   
      
Number of content providers offering non-prioritized content    
      
Utility of internet consumption      
Marginal value that a consumer places on internet access waiting time per unit        
Marginal value that a consumer places on internet access          
Ranges for the slope of advertisement inverse demand curve parameter    [     ] 
Average value for           
 
Average value for       1 
 
Concentrated sigma:         
 
Disperse sigma:         
 
Number of simulations: 10 
 
Normal distribution parameters                  
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Traditionally know as ISP (Internet Service Provider) 
 
2 https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2014/1h-2014-
globalinternet-phenomena-report.pdf 
 
3
 A comparative analysis of the evolution of the market size of each segment of the internet value chain from 2010 
to 2016 can be found here:  
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/178350/internet-value-chain-economics.pdf/bd910b2c-bdae- 
4d6f-8903-f5edad6784eb 
http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GSMA_The-internet-Value-Chain_WEB.pdf 
 
4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/content/strengthening-consumer-protection-and-ensuring-
consistent-rules 
 
5 See Articles 76 and 77, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, FCC 15-24 (Mar. 12, 2015). https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-
open-internet-order 
 
6 http://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-courts-findings-fact#vf 
 
7 AT&T sued Vonage on patent infringement. Vonage reached an agreement with AT&T. More 
information on this case can be found here. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1272830/000119312508059036/dex1039.htm . A similar case 
that also shows a refusal to deal case can be found at  
https://transition.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opinions/2004/02-682-011304.pdf 
 
8 See, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001031582.pdf 
 
9 Multi-homing refers to the availability of multiple internet APs in the area a consumer or a content 
provider is located. 
 
10 https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf  
 
11 Competition regulation might also change market structure, especially in low density population 
areas, for example mandating to share the access network with an entrant or forcing the existence of 
mobile network virtual operators. 
 
12 For example, technology improvements in data transmission and compression technologies reduce 
network congestion and the perception of increased quality of prioritized traffic. Also, the scarcity of 
spectrum restricts the number of mobile broadband providers restricting ND to only one network. 
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13 A super- index of the type NN, NB or NO in any of the consumer and producer surplus or total welfare 
expression identifies the scenario being analyzed. 
 
14 It should be noted that the increased utility of reduced delay is captured in the model by the position 
of the AP in the square. Some positions have higher utility for consumers that value the most 
prioritization. 
 
15 For example, an advertiser will pay more to a content provider the higher the number of internet 
users consuming the content. Similarly, an advertiser will pay more to a content provider the higher the 
quantity of content being distributed to the internet user. For example, video streaming has higher 
quality the higher the number of data packages being transmitted keeping the rest of variables, such as 
compression technology, constant. 
 
16 For example Google, the market leader in internet advertising and marketing, has created the service 
AdSense for advertisers. This service offer advertisement space to publicist in internet sites. AdSense 
works crawling web pages for content and delivering ads based on that content. The more rich and 
relevant is the content the more possibilities have the site to receive higher income from advertisers. 
The price of and ad space is calculated using a cost per click bid and a score metric evaluating the quality 
of the ad. The quality score measures how useful it is the ad to the people who see it in this site and it is 
based on several factors, including the predicted click-through rate (performance of the ad on a site), 
the relevance of the advertisers and the set of keywords of the site. 
 
17 See: 
http://www.digitalstrategyconsulting.com/intelligence/2014/06/ad_revenue_per_user_google_faceboo
k_twitter.php 
 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-average-revenue-per-user-2015-11 
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The digital revolution is deeply transforming the economy and society. It has created 
enormous opportunities and also new risks. Growth, enhanced productivity, better democracy 
and social inclusion are some of the opportunities but at the same time these transformations 
are challenging human and consumer rights, social policies and economic efficiency.  
Recent literature on digital economy issues is focused on three relevant fields. The first is the 
optimal supply of digital networks with externalities and high entry barriers. Barriers stem 
from the economics of deployment of digital networks, especially some network segments, 
and from the restricted access to the radio-electric spectrum. Secondly, the creation of market 
power linked to the concentrated sale of digital goods and services in a few vendors. Market 
power is generated from the demand side due to network externalities and reduced costs of 
digital transactions. These two factors are leading to the creation of monopsony power that 
may affect not only the new digital but also traditional markets. Finally, the transactions and 
interactions among network providers, digital service providers, consumers and vendors raise 
difficult questions about the optimal prices to remunerate efficiently all involved parties. 
This thesis proposes regulations and strategies for the economic efficiency and optimal 
provision of digital networks, goods and services contributing to some of the topics of focus in 
recent literature on digital economy. One problem is the existence of entry barriers to 
companies providing internet access. We contribute to the literature by analyzing efficient 
allocation of spectrum, one of its causes, in chapters 1 and 2. Another problem is the optimal 
prices to remunerate network providers, digital service providers, consumers and vendors. We 
contribute by examining the impact of price discrimination of internet service providers under 
duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail broadband 
access in chapter 3. 
Chapter 1 offers some proposals for the evaluation of the efficient allocation of spectrum to 
radio communication services. New approaches to spectrum management have resulted in a 
more efficient production of services. These approaches enabled better quality of service, the 
reduction of the amount of spectrum required, increased coverage and reduced prices. 
However, the role of the public sector is still essential in spectrum allocation. Technology 
advancement and improvements in the licensing methods must be complemented with 
processes of reallocation led by the public sector enabling higher allocative efficiency of 
resources. This chapter provides a methodology to measure the net benefit of the reallocation 
of a spectrum band intended to guide regulators and policy makers. After the reallocation, the 
band will be used by the incumbent and new entrant services. We have identified the 
following facts.  
 The calculation of benefits and of the opportunity costs of spectrum usage should 
include the external value associated to the provision of services in cases where 
externalities can only be obtained using the studied frequency band. 
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 Demand for spectrum is driven by the quantity and quality of services consumed. For 
some services the population density is also a driver of spectrum demand.  
 
 The cost of deploying networks to use the spectrum is a key element to determine the 
private value associated to the use of a frequency band. Deployment costs may be 
approximated by using production functions. The production function should be 
composed by several input arguments one of which is the spectrum. There are other 
inputs such as the number of stations, and the use of wired solutions that may be 
substitutes of a frequency band. If the service is using other frequencies all of them 
should be included in the analysis. 
 
 Utility of spectrum usage is variable. It depends on the portion of spectrum being 
considered. Some portions are in great demand and have higher prices. Different 
portions of spectrum are not perfect substitutes one another, consequently, 
frequencies have variable substitution margins. The allocation of frequencies with 
similar features to services produces decreasing marginal returns. The key goal of 
spectrum management is to allocate the spectrum so that the marginal benefit 
obtained through the allocation of spectrum to an entrant equals the marginal 
opportunity cost of the incumbent relinquishing a portion of spectrum. 
 
 Reallocation of spectrum produces transition costs that should be included in the cost 
benefit analysis. The cost of transition may include the adaptation of transmitting 
and/or receiving devices to change the frequencies used. Operating expenses 
stemming from the provision of services in the new and old frequencies to avoid 
service interruption during the transition period, costs of minimizing harmful 
interferences during the deployment of the entrant’s network and costs associated to 
coverage losses. Sometimes the reallocation may also reduce costs if the provision of 
the incumbent service is streamlined. 
 
 If a band is planned to be allocated in a harmonized way across a large geographical 
area with high expected number of customers, economies of scale can be obtained in 
the manufacture of the equipment required to use the frequency band. There may 
also be economies of scale in service provision. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the optimal path and speed of spectrum management reform under 
associated uncertain costs and benefits. The question in spectrum management is no longer if 
reform is necessary to give market more participation but the path and speed of reform with 
current and expected technology advance. In this chapter, we analyze reform types 
categorizing them in terms of the type of efficiency gain that the reform is intended to produce 
and the associated uncertainty stemming from the intrinsic physical features of spectrum and 
the insufficient internalization of technology advancements in regulation. The chapter offers a 
model to ascertain the optimal speed of reform and shed some light on the policy options to 
reduce uncertainty in the associated costs and benefits of reform. We have determined when 
to choose a gradual or a big bang reform depending on technology and whether to wait or not 
for a new technological advancement. Both results depend on the expected outcome of the 
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reform, the probability of realization of the states of nature and the value of reversal to the 
previous state of nature.  
Transactions enabling allocative and dynamic efficiency are not yet possible to be produced 
solely by market forces. New approaches such as the design of incentive auctions give a 
broader role to market participants in spectrum allocation but the active contribution of the 
regulatory authority is still necessary to design the direct and reverse auction and the 
repackaging process. A different instrument, new technologies enabling to share the spectrum 
previously used by an incumbent service, also improve allocative efficiency making market 
agents more involved in spectrum allocation. However, sharing techniques are usually limited 
to either short range devices, in the case of underlay spectrum techniques, or by the 
availability of unused spectrum in certain areas or time slots, the case of dynamic spectrum 
sharing. Spectrum sharing techniques are not means to enable the change of use of a band 
solely by market forces. 
Chapter 3 presents a model of price discrimination of over the top providers under duopolistic 
competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail broadband access. 
Network neutrality regulation prevents price discrimination from access providers to content 
providers and product differentiation in terms of connection quality in the retail broadband 
access market. This chapter analyzes the economic implications of price discrimination under 
duopolistic competition and multi-dimensional product differentiation in retail internet access 
using a sequential-moves game theoretic model. Under this framework, we discuss the impact 
of product differentiation and price discrimination on social welfare, and offer systematic 
simulations using feasible ranges for parameters value to help discern the impact of departing 
from network neutrality regulation on social welfare. 
Abandoning network neutrality regulation results in a reduction of the quantity of internet 
content produced. The new regulatory approach, network diversity, produces a significant 
reduction of prioritized content while the quantity of content non-susceptible of being 
prioritized remains unchanged. The reduction in the quantity of content is equal in the two 
network diversity scenarios considered - both and only one access provider prioritizing traffic - 
thus, even when only one access provider offers prioritized content the reduction is 
materialized on equal footing.   
Under network diversity, access providers enjoy higher income from the tax charged to CPs for 
prioritization but content providers offering prioritized content, and advertisers suffer an 
income reduction. Income reduction depends on the sum of prices paid by advertisers to 
content providers and also on consumer preferences when only one access provider offer 
prioritization. Firms supplying non-prioritized content enjoy the same surplus. Abandoning 
network neutrality has two different types of effects on consumer’s utility. On one hand, it 
reduces utility through a decrease in the value of the ratio of content actually available to 
content available with perfect competition. On the other hand, the disutility caused by the 
delay of data packages is reduced via the ratio of prioritized content to content not susceptible 
of prioritization.  The simulation is necessary to measure net impact. A change in the 
regulatory regime would lead to different internet access market structures because there is a 
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rotation of the indifferent consumer´s line via changes in the ratio of prioritized content to 
content not susceptible of prioritization. Even when the marginal disutility that consumers 
place on product options and waiting time remains constant, the change in the ratio of 
prioritized content to content not susceptible of prioritization would rotate the indifferent 
consumer´s line.  
Results are expressed with respect to the maximum utility that a consumer could obtain with 
perfect competition in the provision of internet content, which is set to 1. However, 
consumers don’t enjoy the maximum utility but a portion of it, because there exists reduced 
competition and/or a tax on content production. 
Simulations show that network neutrality regulation is welfare superior to network diversity 
under the model assumptions with the values and value ranges given to parameters. Departing 
from network neutrality regulation leads to an abrupt decrease of the consumer surplus of 
internet users, from 0.4 to between 0.01 and 0.26. This effect weights much more in total 
welfare than the increase in APs surplus coming from the tax charged to content providers.  
The increase in the producer surplus of access providers, from 0.06 to a maximum of 0.34 is 
not enough to compensate the reduction of the consumer surplus of internet users. Among 
the two network diversity scenarios, results are very similar with slightly higher total welfare in 
the case where only one content provider offers prioritized traffic. Disperse range of 
parameter values for content’s relevance and the sum of prices paid by all advertisers tend to 
produce higher total welfare.  
We can set a monetary value for the maximum utility parameter   to make simulation results 
more intuitive. For example, if we set the value to 150$ per month, the simulation shows that 
total welfare would range from 57$ to 102$, consumer’s utility from 1$ to 60$. The average 
ARPU for access providers varies from 9$ to 51$, for CPs from 8$ to 20$, and for advertisers 
from 2$ to 6.8$. Although the values for content’s relevance and the sum of prices paid by all 
advertisers have been generated randomly using Montecarlo simulation modeling, they have a 
significant relation with real observed ARPU values. 
Although additional extensions can be found in each chapter, we point out some extensions to 
the studies carried out in this thesis. For example, the first block could be complemented with 
the empirical analysis of the value of spectrum re-allocation. For some spectrum bands, the 
price paid in an auction is a good proxy for the market value of the portion of spectrum being 
auctioned. In the second block, another field left for future research is the analysis of the 
potential impact of a change on the internet access pricing regulation on the incentives to 
invest and innovate. There might be an impact in both, the provision of digital assets and the 
deployment of networks.                                                                                                              
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Table of Regulation.17: Regulation of the digital transformation in the European Union 
Economic Policy Area Topic Legislative 
Development 
Scope 
Competition 
Spectrum allocation 
General regulatory 
Framework for ECN and 
associated services 
Directive 2002/21/EC 
Directive 2009/140/EC 
Regulation 544/2009 
Defining procedures for: 
- Spectrum allocation secondary 
market, allocation of numbers 
- Standardization and interoperability 
-Security of networks 
- Ex-ante ECN regulation 
 
Competition 
 
Access and 
interconnection to ECN 
and associated facilities 
Directive 2002/19/EC 
Directive 2009/140/EC 
Defining obligations of ECN providers 
with significant market power 
Authorization of ECN 
and access to rights of 
way 
Spectrum usage rights 
 
 
Authorization of ECN 
networks and services 
Directive 2002/20/EC 
Directive 2009/140/EC 
Defining authorization rules and 
conditions for : 
-ECN deployment 
-Rights of use of spectrum/Rights of use 
of numbers 
Digital social policy-
externalities 
 
Network neutrality 
Universal Service 
Consumer rights 
Network  neutrality 
Directive 2002/22/EC 
Directive 2009/136/EC 
Regulation 2015/2120 
Rules and conditions for: 
-Universal service obligations 
-Consumer’s rights protection 
-Equal and non-discriminatory 
treatment of internet traffic 
Digital fundamental 
rights 
Privacy and 
confidentiality of 
personal data 
Directive 2002/58/EC 
Directive 2006/24/EC 
Directive 2009/136/EC 
Protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the digital world. Privacy 
and confidentiality 
Competition Establishment of the 
regulatory body for ECN, 
BEREC. 
Regulation 1211/2009 
(New regulation 
forthcoming) 
Responsibilities of BEREC 
-Disseminate best practices 
-Regulatory assistance 
-Issue reports 
Competition Regulation of prices of 
the access to ECN when 
abroad 
Regulation 531/2012 
Regulation 2015/2120 
Ensuring users do not pay excessive 
prices using ECN when travelling 
around Europe 
Spectrum allocation Establishment of the 
Radio Spectrum Policy 
Group 
Decision 2002/622/EC 
Decision 2009/978/EU 
Responsibilities of RSPG: 
-Assistance to the Commission on 
spectrum policy 
- Preparation of multiannual radio 
spectrum policy programs 
-Spectrum use harmonized conditions 
Reallocation of 
spectrum-technology 
change 
Spectrum allocation and 
technology change 
Directive 2009/114/EC  
Council Directive 
87/372/EEC 
Decision 2016/687 
Decision 2016/339 
Decision 2016/750 
-Technological neutrality of spectrum 
use 
-Harmonized use of spectrum in Europe 
Digital social policy-
externalities 
 
Public aid for 
connectivity in public 
spaces 
Wi-Fi for all regulation 
forthcoming 
Public Aid. Free Wi-Fi in public spaces  
Competition 
Spectrum allocation 
Authorizations and 
usage rights 
Unified regulatory 
Framework for ECN 
European code for 
electronic 
communications 
forthcoming 
Unification of  framework, access, 
authorization and universal service 
directives 
 
Source: Authors 
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Regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Regulation.18: Regulation of the digital transformation in Spain 
Economic Policy Area Topic Legislative 
Development 
Scope 
Competition 
Property rights definition 
Consumer’s rights 
Digital constitutional 
rights 
General regulatory 
framework for 
Telecommunications 
Ley 9/2014 General  de 
Telecomunicaciones 
General principles for: 
- Competition ECN 
- Universal service 
- ECN access to rights of way 
- Consumer’s data privacy 
- Consumer rights 
-Standardization of devices 
-Spectrum property rights 
 
Digital transactions  
Network neutrality 
Consumer rights, digital 
services and e-commerce 
Ley 34/2002 
Orden PRE/361/2002  
Conditions for digital service 
provision: 
-Consumer’s data storage 
-Digital contracts 
-Digital advertising 
-Respect for fundamental rights 
(intellectual property, health 
protection,  
non-discrimination) 
Contract obligations for 
ECN services 
Consumer rights ECN Real Decreto 899/2009 Access to ECN services conditions 
- Quality of service 
-Contract obligations 
Digital social policy-
Externalities 
Universal service Obligations 
 
Real Decreto 424/2005 Conditions 
-Access to rights of way 
-Universal service obligations 
-Consumer’s rights 
Competition Establishment of the 
regulatory body for 
competition, CNMC 
Ley 3/2013 
Real Decreto 657/2013 
CNMC responsibilities on digital 
markets: 
-Analysis and definition of 
markets with ex ante regulation 
-Identification of significant 
market power (SMP) 
-Conditions for companies with 
SMP 
-Conflict resolution 
Competition among  ECN 
providers 
Regulation  of ECN markets Real Decreto 
2296/2004 
Conditions 
-Ex-ante regulation of ECN 
-Access and interconnection to 
ECN 
- Plans for allocation of numbers 
Property rights. 
Secondary market 
Spectrum allocation 
plans 
Spectrum use Real Decreto 844/1989 
Real Decreto 123/2017 
Orden IET/1311/2013 
Regulation of spectrum 
-Property rights 
-Secondary market 
-Spectrum allocation plans 
Spectrum allocation table Spectrum Allocation Table in 
Spain 
Orden IET/787/2013 Table of frequency allocations, 
international and differential 
uses in Spain 
Reallocation of spectrum-
technology change 
Spectrum allocation and 
technology change 
Real Decreto 
1773/1994 
-Technological neutrality in 
spectrum use 
Negative externalities of 
spectrum use 
Spectrum and Health Real Decreto 
1066/2001 
Protection of health against 
electromagnetic emissions 
Competition 
Standardization 
Access to common telecom 
infrastructure in buildings 
 
Real Decreto-ley 
1/1998 
Real Decreto 346/2011 
Orden ITC/1644/2011 
Conditions for telecom 
infrastructure in buildings: 
- Access to the infrastructure 
- Standardization of technical 
features 
Standardization- 
Enforcement of property 
rights 
Standards for 
electromagnetic devices 
Real Decreto 138/1989 
Real Decreto 
1580/2006 
Definition of standards: 
-Electromagnetic compatibility 
Source: Authors 
